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Basic Rights and Anti-Terrorism
Legislation: Can Britain's Criminal
Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy)
Act 1998 Be Reconciled with Its
Human Rights Act?
Abstract
This Note addresses whether Britain's Criminal Justice
(Terrorismand Conspiracy)Act (CJTCA), which permits police
officer opinion testimony as to whether a terroristsuspect is a
member of an illegal terroristorganizationand allows adverse
inferences to be drawn from that suspect's silence, can be
reconciled with the fairtrialprovisions of the Human Rights Act
(HRA). Part HTof this Note describes the background of the
CJTCA, concentratingon the reasonsfor its rushedpassageand
on the evidentiary changes it makes to trials of defendants
charged with terrorist offenses.
Part 1I describes the
background and mechanics of the HRA, which incorporatesthe
European Convention on Human Rights into Britain'sdomestic
law. As the HRA directs Britishjudges to refer to case law of
the European Court of Human Rights for guidance, Part IV
evaluates that tribunal's interpretation of Article 6 of the
Convention, which guarantees the right to a fair trial.
Specifically, this section examines decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights and the British courts with regard to
issues likely to arise in trials under the CJTCA, including the
following: the right to remain silent, the right to cross-examine
adverse witnesses, the prosecution's duty to disclose
information, and the doctrine of "equality of arms." Part V
applies the principles explicated by those authorities to the
evidentiary provisions of the CJTCA, and assesses the
soundness of the policy goals behind it. In this section, the
author concludes that many trials under the CJTCA will run
afoul of the HRA. Accordingly, the CJTCA should be repealed
or given a very narrow interpretationby the British Courts. The
authoralso concludes that the CJTCA will not advance the goals
for which it was passed-reducingterroristactivity in the United
Kingdom and bolsteringthe peace process in NorthernIreland.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario. You are arrested and charged
with membership in a terrorist organization. At the police station,
you refuse to answer questions posed by the interrogating police
officer. Maybe you are nervous. Maybe you are awaiting legal
representation. Maybe you are somewhat uneducated, inarticulate,
and incapable of effectively expressing yourself under the
circumstances.
Your exchange with the police officer goes
something like this:
Policeman: 'I have reliable information that you are a member of a
terrorist organization. What do you say?"
Suspect: 'What information?"
Policeman: "I am not at liberty to say."
I
Suspect: "Then-nothing."
At trial, the judge or jury hears a high-ranking police officer testify
to your refusal to answer questions during interrogation and that in
his professional opinion your are a member of a terrorist
organization.
On cross-examination, defense counsel asks the
officer on what information he bases his opinion, but the officer
declines to answer on the basis that disclosing such information
would jeopardize national security or would be contrary to the public
interest. You decide to maintain your right to silence at trial. Based
2
on the above evidence, the verdict comes back---Gulty"

1.
Donald Findlay, Cut Cne, Not Corners:Donald Fiidlay,QC, Sounds A Note
Of CautionIn The Wake Of New Anti-TerroristLegislation, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, Sept.
6, 1998, at 15.
2.
Id.
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Critics of recent anti-terrorism legislation in Britain, especially
civil rights groups, indicate that the scenario above is possible under
the government's new laws. The Criminal Justice (Terrorism and
Conspiracy) Act 1998 (CJTCA), which passed through the House of
Commons within twenty-four hours of being drafted, 3 makes
significant changes in the types of evidence that can be admitted at
trials of defendants suspected of involvement with terrorist
organizations. The Act permits judges and juries to draw inferences
4
from a suspect's silence in the face of police interrogation.
Additionally, the opinion evidence of a senior police officer that a
defendant is a member of a terrorist group is also admissible at
trial.5 The Act was passed in the emotional aftermath of one of the
Northern Ireland's worst bombings and the bombings of the U.S.
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in August 1998.
At the same time Britain passed these tough anti-terrorism
measures, it adopted the European Convention on Human Rights
(HRA)6 into its domestic law. The HRA, which incorporates the
terms of the Convention almost verbatim, will allow claimants to
enforce Convention rights in British courts. 7 It will become effective
in October 2000, but the Scottish courts have already entertained
claims based on the Convention since May 20, 1999.8 Although
British Courts will not be permitted to strike down legislation under
the HRA, 9 courts will be directed to favor an interpretation of a
statute which is in accord with the Convention over an

3.
See In the space of a couple of hours on Wednesday night, the Government
swept in legislationthatshot holes throughthe rights of terroristsuspects-and,in doing
so, underminedthe rights of us all. These measures,which could only have come in on
the back of public revulsion over the Omagh bombing, will have repercussionsfar
beyond their narrow target, W. MORNING NEWS (Plymouth), Sept. 5, 1998, at 11

[hereinafter In the space of a couple of hours]; see also Emergency Bills in Britainand
Ireland Drawn Up to Crack Down on Terrorism in the Wake of the Omagh Atrocity
Became Law Today, EXPRESS & ECHO (Exeter), Sept. 4, 1998, at 8 [hereinafter

Emergency Bills in Britain andIreland]; Catherine Macleod, Tolerance is Watch Word
for TerroristLegislationDissenters,THE HERALD (Glasgow), Sept. 4, 1998, at 10.

4.
Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act, 1998, ch. 40, (Eng.)
[hereinafter CJTCA].
5.
See id.
6.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 1 [hereinafter European Convention
on Human Rights].
7.
Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42, § 7 (Eng.).
8.
See Robert Verkaik, Law: A Case of Guilty Until Proven Innocent; A High
Court Case is Challengingthe Prevention of Terrorism Act, THE INDEPENDENT (London),
July 27, 1999, at 14 (noting that Scotland introduced the Human Rights Act 16
months ahead of England and Wales and that lawyers expect the Scottish experience
to be similar to that of the entire United Kingdom next year).

9.

See Human Rights Act, supra note 7, at § 4. The court may make a

"declaration of incompatibility" where a statutory provision cannot be reconciled with
the Convention. However, the statute continues to be valid. The powers of the British

courts to enforce the Convention are discussed in more detail later in this Note.
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interpretation which is not.1 0 The HRA will effectively act as a "Bill
of Rights" for the United Kingdom.
This Note deals specifically with whether the provisions of the
Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998, permitting

opinion testimony of senior police officers and inferences of guilt
from a suspect's silence, will, in practice, contravene the European
Convention on Human Rights. If British courts do not construe the
provisions of the CJTCA narrowly, convictions may result in cases

where the substantial evidence presented by the state is the
suspect's silence combined with police opinion evidence that is
basically immune from cross-examination. Such convictions would
violate Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Without a very narrow
accordingly, would violate the HRA.
construction of the CJTCA, courts will essentially have to choose
between applying the CJTCA or the HRA to the trials of terrorist
suspects. An expansive interpretation of the CJTCA would violate
rights considered fundamental in most democratic societies, such
as the right to silence, the right to be presumed innocent, and the
right to confront witnesses and accusers.
The evidentiary provisions of the CJTCA will be analyzed
primarily under case law from the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) and also under British common law, as these are the
sources which the HRA directs judges to consider when hearing
claims under the Convention."' The HRA may provide persons
charged with offenses to which the CJTCA applies a viable means of
challenging the manner in which their trial is conducted. 12
While the CJTCA is part of a joint effort between the British and
Irish governments to combat terrorism through similar legislation,
only the British legislation will be considered for the purposes of this
Note. Because Britain is considered by many to be among the
leaders of liberal democracies, its experience with the CJTCA will
most likely have more influence over legislation in other countries,
especially within Europe and in the United States and Canada.
Consideration of Britain's attempts to deal with terrorism and at the
same time provide for protection of civil rights is relevant given the
current scope of terrorism's threat. Britain's experience with the
CJTCA may influence the manner in which other large democracies,

10.

Id. § 3.

11.

Id.§3.

12.
The Scottish courts are already hearing challenges to the Prevention of
Terrorism Act, the legislation to which the evidentiary provisions of the CJTCA apply,
based upon the Convention. See supranote 8 and accompanying text. Most of these
cases have dealt with suspects' lack of access to a lawyer during interrogation or
delays in cases being tried. See Verkaik, supra note 8.
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such as the United States, decide to deal with the increasing
13
prevalence of both domestic and international terrorism.

II. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE (TERRORISM AND CONSPIRACY) ACT 1998

Passed in what seemed like record time for a piece of legislation,
the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998 was
attacked by civil rights groups as an ill-thought-out, short-sighted
solution to the problem of organized terrorism. It was criticized not
only for its substantive changes to the laws of criminal procedure in
the United Kingdom but also for the political haste in which it
passed. Despite the criticisms against it, there was less than
substantial opposition to the bill in the form of parliamentary votes.
However, some MPs, especially in the Liberal Democratic Party, felt
a heavy backlash from party backbenchers and constituents in the
weeks following the CJTCA's passage.
A. The Political Climate
The CJTCA passed the House of Commons in a sixteen-hour
sitting on September 4, 1998 after a marathon session that began
the previous day and lasted into the early hours of the morning.14
It became law later the same day when it cleared the House of Lords
with little opposition.' 5 Parliament was recalled from its summer
6
holiday for an emergency session to debate the bill.'
Tony Blair's Labour government introduced the bill for the
immediate purpose of increasing the pressure on splinter
paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland that were attempting to halt
the peace process in Ulster. 17 On August 15, less than three weeks
before the bill's introduction, a bomb had exploded in Omagh,
Northern Ireland, causing the deaths of twenty-nine people. 18 The
13.
See generally Roberta Smith, America Tries to Come to Terms with
Terrorism:The United States Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death PenaltyAct of 1996 v.
BritishAnti-TerrorismLaw and InternationalResponse, 5 CARDOZO J. INT L & COMP. L.
249 (1997) (discussing and comparing the responses of the American and British
governments to international and domestic terrorism).
14.
See The Weeks Top Ten BritishStories, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 5, 1998, at 4.
15.
But see Dangerous Anti-Terrorism Bill Blasted by Top British Judge,
TORONTO STAR, Sept. 4, 1998, at A10 (quoting Lord Lloyd Berwick, one of 12 Lords of
Appeal who constitute the highest court in Britain, stating that the anti-terrorism
legislation was "a mere mouse of a bill and in some respects it is a dangerous
mouse.").
16.
See Emergency Bills in Britainand Ireland, supranote 3, at 8.
17.
See Anti-TerrorLaw on Course to Become Law, BELFAST NEWS LETTER, Sept.
4, 1998, at 8.
18.
See Patrick Wintour et. al., Focus Ireland: A FRANTIC RACE FROM
HORROR TO HOPE,THE OBSERVER, Sept. 6, 1998, at 16.
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bomb was allegedly an attempt to frustrate the ongoing peace
process 19 by the Real IRA, a militant republican group that split off
from the Provisional IRA because of the endorsement of the peace
process by the Provisionals through the republican political party
Sinn Fein. The British government appeared to be playing catch-up
to the Irish Government, which had also passed new laws 20 aimed

at rounding up the Omagh bombers. 2 1 The bombings of the U.S.
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, as well as pressure on the British
government by other countries who claimed Britain had become a
haven for planning international terrorist plots, 2 2 also contributed

to the urgency with which the Act was pushed through
23
Parliament.
Aside from the substantive changes effected by the CJTCA,
there was much criticism both from within Parliament and in the
British media of the haste and manner in which it was passed. For
example, not only were members of Parliament recalled from their
summer holiday, but the emergency sitting also lasted only two
days. 2 4 Many MPs claimed that there was not enough time given to
properly debate the Act before its passage.
The bill passed through the House of Commons despite a crossparty coalition of backbench MPs' attempts to force more time for
consideration of the bill. 2 5

The most outspoken leader of the

19.
See generallyThe Belfast Agreement, April 10, 1998, Ir.-U.K. (visited Sept.
4, 1998)
<http://www.ireland.com/special/peace/agreement/agreement.htm>
(webpage no longer available, copy on file with author) The agreement was approved
by large majorities of the peoples of the Republic of Ireland and in the six counties
comprising what is currently British controlled Northern Ireland.
20.
See Offenses Against the State Act, 1998 (Ir.).
21.
See Emergency Bills in Britainand Ireland, supranote 16.
22.
See NewspaperComments on Britain'sNew Anti-TerrorismLegislation,BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Sept. 7, 1998 (reprinting the text of EL KHABAR
(Algiers), in arabic Sept. 5, 1998).
With the passing of the new anti-terrorism bill.., last Thursday... by the
British House of Commons, the first country... suspected of harboring the
most dangerous international terrorist networks has made the first serious
step towards taking tight measures against terrorist which made the United
Kingdom's territory a refuge from which they plan their criminal acts in a
number of places in the world.... A number of states, led by Egypt and
Algeria, had on many occasions called on Britain to stop its policy which
encouraged the networks that supported and planned acts of terrorism.
Id.; see also Jason Bennetto, Police Seize Arab Terror Suspects, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Sept. 24, 1998, at 1; Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, PakistanLinks 50
Killings to London, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Nov. 8, 1998, at 21.
23.
See Philip Webster and Martin Fletcher, British-BasedTerrorPlottersFace
Life Jl
THETIMES (London), Aug. 26, 1998, at 1-2.
24.
See Rachel Donnelly, Tories and Lib Dems Support Terrorist Bil, IRISH
TIMES, Sept. 2, 1998, at 6.
25.
See Dave Frazzle, Anti-TerrorBill Becomes Law, GLOUCESTER CITIZEN, Sept.
4, 1998, at 8.
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opposition to the bill was MP Kevin McNamara, Labour's former
Northern Ireland spokesperson, who protested that the United
Kingdom was already "under the cosh" from the European Court
because of inferences which were permitted to be drawn from a
suspect's decision to remain silent in a criminal case. 26 McNamara
27
contended that the Act would further breach European law.
The government was criticized for allegedly manipulating the
Queen into giving royal assent to the bill before the House of Lords
had finished debating it. This led to criticism from some MPs, most
notable among them former Cabinet Minister Tony Benn, who
28
claimed that this was a breach of constitutional practice.
Normally, the Queen's assent is given only after debate has finished
in both the House of Lords and the House of Commons.
The CJTCA has not yet fulfilled its immediate objectives of
speedily "rounding up" the people responsible for the Omagh
bombing in August 1998. The first significant arrests related to the
bombings were made in late February 1999, more than six months
after the bombing and more than five months after the CJTCA's
rushed passage through parliament. 2 9
The Royal Ulster
Constabulary-the police force in the North of Ireland-and the
Gardai-the Irish Republic's police force-have combined to make
over 100 arrests related to the bombing.3 0 As of late September
1999, the British government has yet to prosecute anyone for
alleged terrorist offenses under the highly controversial CJTCA. 3 1
Irish police have charged only one person under the Republic's
32
similar legislation.

26.
LabourMPs Challenge TerrorLaw, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, Aug. 31, 1998.
27.
See id.
28.
See Benn in a Row Over Role of Queen in TerrorBill, THE HERALD (Glasgow),
Sept. 5, 1998, at 7; Queen Used to Win Vote on TerrorBil Claim;Benn Hits Out at BBC
Report of Royal Approval DuringDebate, BELFAST NEWS LEITER, Sept. 5, 1998, at 8;
Queen Was Manipulated, Claims Benn, BIRMINGHAM POST, Sept. 5, 1998, at 2.
29.
See Jim Dee, PoliceArrest Dozen in Northem Ireland's Omagh CarBombing,
BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 22, 1998, at 31 (reporting that arrests were made immediately
following the bombing and in September 1998, but the suspects were released); see
also Jason Johnson, Smiling Bomber Makes a Mockery of Police Shadows, THE PEOPLE,
Aug. 15, 1999 (reporting that 4000 people have been interviewed in connection with
the bombing in which police believe at least 60 people were involved).
30.
See Woman Arrested in OmaghBlas4 BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 1999, at A6.
31.
See Chris McLaughlin and Ted Oliver, Why Are the Omagh Bombers Still
Free One Year On? Arrests Might Upset the IRA, MAIL ON SUNDAY, Aug. 8, 1999, at 12;
Woman Arrested in Omagh Blast supra note 30.
32.
See Woman Arrested in OmaghBlast, supra note 30.
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The Mechanics of the CJTCA

The CJTCA is intended to work in conjunction with the
34
33
and related anti-terrorism acts,
Prevention of Terrorism Act
which make it an offense to be a member of an organization
specified by the Home Secretary. Among the organizations currently
specified are the Continuity Irish Republican Army, the Red Hand
Defenders, the Orange Volunteers, and the Real Irish Republican
Army (Real IRA).3 5 Organizations like the Provisional IRA (IRA), the
Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the Irish National Liberation Army
(INLA), and the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) as well as other
paramilitary groups could be proscribed if they fail to continue their
36
current cease-fires.
One of the fundamental evidentiary changes made by the
CJTCA is that it permits police officers of or above the rank of
superintendent to give oral evidence that "in his opinion, the
accused... belongs to an organisation which is specified, or...
belonged at a particular time to an organisation which was then
specified."3 7 The officer's statement is "admissible as evidence of the
matter stated," but the accused cannot be committed to trial or
convicted solely on the basis of the officer's statement
alone.3 8 Thus, the police officer becomes somewhat of an expert
witness, permitted not only to testify to facts of which he has
knowledge, but also as to inferences and opinions.
Furthermore, the CJTCA continues a trend in British law of
In considering
curtailing suspects' rights to remain silent.3 9

33.
See CJTCA, supranote 4, ch. 40, § 1(1).
34.
Cf. Northern Ireland (Sentences)Act, 1998, ch. 35 (Eng.); Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act, 1998, ch. 9 (Eng.).
See Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, 1998, § 3(8).
35.
The IRA, UDA, and INLA were among other organizations proscribed in the
36.
past. See id. § 30(2), sched. 2.
CJTCA, supranote 4, ch. 40, § 1(2).
37.
38.
Id. § 1(3).
39.
See, e.g., Gregory W. OReilly, EnglandLimits the Right to Silence and Moves
toward an InquisitorialSystem of Justice, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 402, 402
(1994) (discussing the provisions of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994,
permitting the drawing of adverse inferences from the silence of a suspect during
interrogation and at trial); Diane Beckman, Note, You Have the Right to Be Silent..
. Anything You Do Not Say May Be Used Against You. Is the Right to Silence in Great
BritainReally a Protection?, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 95, 96-97 (1995) (suggesting that
changes to the right to silence in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994
undermine the right to a fair trial and the right to assistance of counsel); Thomas P.
Quinn, Jr., Note, JudicialInterpretation of Silence: The Criminal Evidence Order of
1988, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 365, 373-77 (1994) (explicating the Criminal
Evidence Order, 20 N. Ir. Stat., No. 1987 (1988), which permits adverse inferences
from silence in four situations: (1) where the accused is silent while interrogated but
puts forth an explanation or alibi at trial, (2) where the prosecution establishes a case
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whether a suspect belongs or belonged to a specified organization,
the CJTCA permits the jury to draw inferences from a suspect's
failure to respond to interrogation. 4 0 This applies in the following
two situations: where the suspect was questioned before being
charged and was permitted to see a lawyer before questioning; and
where the suspect has been charged or informed by the police that
he might be charged for an offense and is questioned after being
permitted to see a lawyer. 4 1 Thus, under ch. 40, § 1(4) the jury may
draw adverse inferences where:
(a) at any time before being charged with the offence the accused, on
being questioned under caution by a constable, failed to mention a
fact which is material to the offence and which he could reasonably
be expected to mention, and
(b) before being questioned he was permitted to consult a solicitor.

Under ch. 40, § 1(5) an inference may be drawn where:
(a)on being charged with an offense or informed by a constable that
he might be prosecuted for it the accused failed to mention a fact
which is material to the offense and which he could reasonably be
expected to mention, and
(b) before being charged or informed he was permitted to consult a
solicitor.

Evidence of the accused's silence or failure to respond can be given
either prior to or subsequent to evidence "tending to establish the
fact which the accused is alleged to have failed to
mention."4 2 Again, the suspect cannot be tried or convicted solely
4
on the basis of inferences drawn from the suspect's silence. 3
III. THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT INCORPORATING THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HuMAN RIGHTS

Set to come into effect in October 2000, the Human Rights Act
is intended to be somewhat of a "Bill of Rights" for the United
Kingdom. It incorporates most of the European Convention on
Human Rights and will allow aggrieved persons to enforce
Convention rights in the British court system. Previously, British
citizens could only enforce these rights by applying to the European
Commission of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France.

to which the accused must answer and the accused refuses to testify, (3) where the
accused refuses to explain certain facts such as marks on clothing, and (4) where the
accused fails to account for his presence at a given location).
40.
See CJTCA, supranote 4, ch. 40, § 1(6)(a).
41.
See id. § 1(4)-(5).
42.
Id. § 1(7).
43.
See id. §1(6)(b).
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A. The Background of the Human Rights Act
The Human Rights Bill was part of the platform on which the
Labour party ran successfully in
the last parliamentary
election. The Bill began as a consultation paper written by Labour
MPs Jack Straw and Paul Boateng in late 1996 and was first
published as part of the government's white paper, Rights Brought
Home, in October 1997.4 It is part of Tony Blair's goal of creating
a "human rights culture" in which "awareness of human rights will
be enhanced in our [British] society."45 The Bill received royal
assent in November 1998 and was originally expected to become
active law on January 1, 2000.46 Because more time was needed to
train the British judiciary about the mechanics of the Human Rights
Act, however, that date has been pushed back to October 2000.4 7
It is predicted to affect lawyers practicing in many fields and to have
a substantial impact on the British criminal justice system once it
48
becomes effective.

44.
See Geoffrey Bindman et al., Recognising Rights-A Look at the Progress
of the Human Rights Bill and Analysis of the Impact of the Government's Rushed AntiTerrorLegislation,95 L. Socy GAZ. 22 (1998).
Critics of the CJTCA might note the possible irony in the fact that Jack Straw, the
current Home Secretary and author of the consultation paper that eventually became
the Human Rights Bill, was also a major proponent of the CJTCA and has power as
Home Secretary to determine which organizations will be listed as "proscribed' under
it.
45.
See Bindman, supranote 44 ("The intention is that ordinary members of
the public will develop a new perception of themselves as the confident possessors
of inviolable fundamental rights, protected by the courts against any encroachment
under whatever authority.").
46.
See Susan Nash & Mark Furse, Human Rights Law Update: The Human
Rights Act 1998, 149 NEw L.J. 877, 891 (1999); Susan Nash & Mark Furse, Human
Rights Law Update: The Human Rights Act 1998, 148 NEw L.J. 1737, 1782 (1998).
47.
See Verkaik, supra note 8.
48.
See Dan Bindman et al., The Right to Redress-The Impact of the Human
Rights Act 1998 Wil Be Pervasive;A Look at How It Will Affect LaunJers in a Wide Range
of Practice Areas, 95 L. SocY GAZ. 20 (1998); David McIntosh, Rights The Way
Through- Whatever Your Place orArea of Practice,If You Are a Solicitor, The Human
Rights Act 1998 Has Direct Relevance, 96 L. SocY GAZ. 14 (1999); see also Francis
Gibb, More Judges Needed for Rights Challenges,THETIMES (London), Sept. 7, 1999
(noting that the Lord Chancellor, expecting a substantial increase in human rights
challenges in British courts, intended to seek parliamentary approval for what would
be the largest increase in the number of judges sitting on the High Court in over a
decade).
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B. The European Convention on Human Rights
and FundamentalFreedoms
The European Convention of Human Rights was signed in Rome
in 1950, 49 with Great Britain as one of the signatories. The
Convention provides that the signatories "shall secure to everyone
in their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ...
this
Convention."5 0 Among these rights is the right to a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal. 5 '
The Convention created two institutions to enforce these
rights-the European Commission on Human Rights and the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).5 2 Persons alleging
violations of a Convention right may apply to the Commission, which
analyzes the relevant facts and law before deciding whether to refer
the case to the ECHR.5 3 Domestic remedies must be exhausted
before applying to the Commission." 4 The ECHR's interpretation of
Convention rights is final.5 5 The ECHR consists of twenty-one
judges, at least seven of whom decide an individual case unless that
chamber of seven requests that the case should be decided by the
full court because it raises a serious question of interpretation of the
56
Convention.
C. Enforcing Convention Rights Under the Human Rights Act
As the United Kingdom is a signatory of the European
Convention on Human Rights, its citizens already may seek redress
from the ECHR in Strasbourg. In fact, the British Government has
been the subject of numerous adverse rulings from the ECHR.5 7
When the HRA becomes effective, persons alleging violations of the
Convention will be able to enforce their Convention rights not only

49.
See Christian Kohler, The Court of Justiceof the EuropeanCommunities and
the European Court of Human Rights, in SUPRANATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
EUROPE: FUNCTIONS AND SOURCES 15, 25 (Igor I. Kavass ed., 1992).

50.
See European Convention on Human Rights, supranote 6, at art. 1.
51.
See id. art. 6.
52.
See id. art. 19; see generally, John P. Flaherty and Maureen P. LallyGreen, FundamentalRights in the European Union, 36 DuQ. L. REv. 249 (1998).
53.
See Kohler, supranote 49, at 29.
54.
See European Convention on Human Rights, supranote 6, art. 26.
55.
Id. art. 27(3).
56.
Id. art. 29(1).
57.

See generally Sue Farran, THE UK BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN

RIGHTS: CASE LAW AND COMMENTARY (1996); A.W.B. Simpson, Round Up the Usual
Suspects: The Legacy of British Colonialismand the European Convention on Human
Rights, 41 LOY. L. REv. 629 (1996).
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in Strasbourg, but in the courts of the United Kingdom as well. 58 To
that end, the HRA prohibits "public authorities" 5 9 from acting "in a
way which is incompatible with one or more of the Convention
rights."60 The public authority's act is not prohibited, however, if
the public authority could not have acted differently pursuant to a
provision of primary legislation. 6 1 Neither houses of Parliament are
considered to be public authorities. 6 2 An "act" is defined to include
omissions as well as overt acts, except failures to introduce or enact
legislation.6 Any person who is or would be the victim of an
unlawful act may bring action under the HRA or rely on the
Convention rights in any legal proceeding."
Specifically with regard to legislation, the HRA requires that so
far as possible, it must be read and applied "in a way which is
compatible with Convention rights." 6 5 When interpreting the
legislation, the U.K. courts are directed to consider judgments,
declarations, decisions, and advisory opinions of the ECHR, as well
as opinions and decisions of the Commission. 6 6 However, the ECHR
is without power to affect the continuing validity or enforcement of
the legislation. 67
The ECHR may make a "declaration of
incompatibility" where the legislation cannot be reconciled with
Convention rights and where the legislation in question precludes
removal of the incompatibility. 68 Additionally, in such cases the
HRA provides an expedited procedure by which the relevant
government minister may amend the legislation to make it
compatible with the Convention rights, subject to Parliament's right
to object within a limited time. 6 9

58.
See generallyJudge Christopher Tromans, Benchmarks: Human Rights, A
Beginner's Guide: A Sketch of the European Convention on Human Rights and the
Human Rights Act 1998 Which Will be Implemented on 2 October2000, 96 LAw Socy
GAZ. 34 (Sept. 2, 1999). Arguably, the Human Rights Act could have the effect of
stifling the number of applications from British citizens brought before the European
Commission on Human Rights because of the Convention's requirement that
domestic remedies be exhausted. This is likely to please some critics of the European
Court of Human Rights. See, e.g., Fenton Bresler, Can a Foreign CourtPronounceon
BritishJustice?, 20 NATL L. J. A26 (June 2, 1998).
59.
See Geoffrey Bindman, supra note 44, noting that this term will be
interpreted broadly to include the courts themselves.
60.
Human Rights Act, supranote 7, § 6(1).
61.
See id. § 6(2)(a)-(b).
62.
See id. § 6(3).

63.
64.
65.

Seei. § 6(6).
See id. § 7(1).
IdL § 3(1).

66.

Id. § 2(1).

67.
68.

See id. § 3(2)
See id. § 4(4).

69.

See Bindman, supranote 44.
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The rights incorporated into the HRA are embodied in Articles
2 through 18 of the Convention. The right to a fair trial is explicated
in Article 6.70

IV. ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
UNDER ECHR DECISIONS AND BRITISH CASE LAW

Article 6 has generated more case law in the ECHR than any
other article in the Convention. 7 1 The ECHR has recognized the
right to a fair trial as fundamental in a democratic society and,
accordingly, has held that a narrow or restrictive interpretation of
Article 6 would be at odds with the objectives of the Convention. 72
Article 6 reads as follows:
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly
but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial
in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a
democratic society, where the interests ofjuveniles or the protection
of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed
innocent until proven guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following
minimum rights:
a. to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands
and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him;
b. to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his
defence;
c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his
own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal

70.
See European Convention on Human Rights, supranote 6, art. 6. The
rights are as follows: the right to life; the right not to be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the right not to be held in slavery
or forced servitude and not to be required to perform forced or compulsory labour;
the right to liberty and security of person; the right to a fair hearing of any criminal
charge; the right not to be convicted for what was not unlawful at the time of its
commission; the right to respect for private and family life, home and
correspondence; the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; the right
to freedom of expression; the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of
association with others; the right to marry and found a family for those of
marriageable age. See Bindman, supranote 44.
71.
See ANDREW GROTIAN, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, HUMAN RIGHTS FILES No. 13,
ARTICLE 6 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL

6 (1994).
72.

See Delcourt v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 355 (1970).
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assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so
require;
d. to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf
under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
e. to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot
understand or speak the language used in court. 73

Under Article 6, the ECHR looks at the proceedings as a whole to
determine fairness. 7 4 Particular incidents may, however, have a
75
decisive effect, and defects may be remedied in later proceedings.
The ECHR does not pass on whether the court made errors of fact
76
or law.
The provisions of Article 6 relating to the presumption of
innocence and the right to examine adverse witnesses are of
particular importance to analyzing a potential prosecution under the
CJTCA. Also important to this analysis are the right to silence,
which the ECHR and the Commission have recognized to be implicit
in Article 6,7 7 and the doctrine of "equality of arms" related to
procedural fairness which is embodied in Article 6.78
A. The Right to Silence and Legal Advice After

Murray v. United Kingdom
While a defendant's right to silence in criminal trials is not
explicitly mentioned in Article 6 of the Convention, the ECHR has
recognized that "the right to remain silent under police questioning
and the privilege against self-incrimination are generally recognized
international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of fair
procedure under Article 6."7 9 The use of the accused's silence
against him will only constitute a violation of Article 6 where the
trial will be declared unfair under all of the facts and
circumstances. 8 0 Thus, the Court has not adopted a rule that the
use of an accused's silence to draw inferences renders the trial
unfair per se for the purposes of Article 6.81
One of the most important and most recent cases from the
ECHR is Murray v. United Kingdom, in which the ECHR addressed

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
48 (1996)
78.
79.
Eur. H.R.
80.
81.

European Convention on Human Rights, supranote 6, art. 6, at 228.
See GROTIAN, supranote 71, at 41.
See i&
See id.
See Murray v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18731/91, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29,
(Commission report).
See GROTIAN, supranote 71, at 4 1.
Murray, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 60, 45 (1996) (citing Funke v. France, 16
Rep. 297).
See id. at 44, 58.
See id.
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the issue of whether the drawing of inferences from an accused's
decision to remain silent, in addition to being denied legal advice for
over forty-eight hours, violated Article 6.82 In Murray, the Crown
charged the applicant and seven other people with conspiracy to
murder, unlawful imprisonment, and membership in the Provisional
IRA, a proscribed organization.8 3 All of these charges were pursuant
to the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)-charges to which the
evidentiary provisions of the CJTCA will apply at trial. 84
Murray was arrested in the hall of a house after police, while
85
conducting a raid, had seen him coming down a flight of stairs.
The police discovered a Mr. L, a police informer who had been
abducted two days earlier in the upstairs bedroom. 8 6 Mr. L later
testified that he was forced by his abductors to confess on audiotape
that he was an informer.8 7 Mr. L also testified that on the night of
the raid, he heard commotion in the house, was told to take off his
blindfold, and then saw Murray standing at the stairs and pulling
the tape out of a cassette. 8 8 Mr. L claims he was told to go
downstairs to the living room to watch television while the police
were there.8 9 Murray did not make any statements upon arrest that
90
explained his presence in the house.
At trial, the judge warned Murray that if he refused to take the
witness stand or to answer any question without good reason, the
court "in deciding whether you are guilty... may take into account
against you to the extent that it considers proper your refusal to give
evidence or to answer any questions."9 1 Pursuant to his lawyers'
advice, Murray neither gave evidence nor called any witnesses on his
behalf.92 Along with supporting evidence from co-defendant DM,
house upon the
Murray's lawyers claimed that his presence in 9the
3
arrival of the police was "recent and innocent."

82.
Id. at 29. See also Saunders v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313,
331 (1997) (holding that there had been a violation of Article 6(1) where statements
given by applicant to DTI inspectors, using their statutory powers of compulsion,
were admitted as evidence in a subsequent criminal trial.).
83.
Murray, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 33, 1 17.
84.
CJTCA, supranote 4, § 1(1).
85.
See Murray, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 33, 1 19.

86.

See id.

87.

See id.

88.
89.
90.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 33-34, 1 20. The Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988

91.
permitted the judge--or jury in ajury trial-to make common sense inferences from
a suspect's silence. The Order's provisions regarding inferences from silence bear a
close similarity to the provisions in the CJTCA applicable to such inferences. See
Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988, arts. 3 & 4.
92.
See Murray, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 34, 1 20, 21.
93.
Id. 121.
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The trial judge (in a "diplock" court without a jury) rejected the
co-defendant's claim that Murray was there innocently.9 4 The judge
further rejected Murray's claim that the trier of fact should not be
permitted to draw adverse inferences where there was a "reasonably
plausible explanation for the accused's conduct consistent with his

innocence."9 5 Accordingly, the judge drew adverse inferences from
Murray's failure to give a reason for his presence in the house when
police questioned him upon arrest. 96 He further drew adverse
inferences from Murray's failure to testify and give an explanation
for his presence when called by the court to do so. 9 7 Based on these
inferences in combination with Mr. L's testimony and the
surrounding circumstances, Murray was found guilty of aiding and
abetting false imprisonment. 98 The trial judge accepted Mr. L's
testimony despite agreeing with defense counsel's submission that
he was a "man fully prepared to lie on oath to advance his own
interests and is a man of no moral worth whatever." 99
The Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland affirmed Murray's
conviction and eight-year sentence.1 0 0 It reasoned that it was
inevitable that the trial judge would draw strong inferences against
him given that Mr. L had identified Murray and testified as to his
being involved in keeping Mr. L held captive, and that Murray had
refused to give answers to the police or the court at trial.1 0°
The European Court of Human Rights began its analysis in
Murray with a review of decisions of the British courts interpreting
the changes to the right to silence made by the Criminal Evidence
(Northern Ireland) Order 1988.102 It noted that the House of Lords
interpreted the statute as first requiring that the prosecution
demonstrate a prima facie case against the defendant, and only then
can the judge or jury make such inferences that appear proper. 10 3
The prima facie case amounts to a case for which the defendant
should answer, making the drawing of inferences from silence
proper.'°4 The Court cited the following British case law in defining
a "prima facie case":
[A] case which is strong enough to go to ajury-i.e., a case consisting
of direct evidence which, if believed and combined with legitimate
inferences based upon it, could lead a properly directed jury to be

94.
95.

See id. 123.
Id. 24.

96.
97.

See id. at 35,
See id.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See id.
Id.
See id. at 35-36, 26.
See id. at 36, 26.
See id. at 36-39.
See id. at 38, 29.
See id.

25.
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satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt... that each of the essential
elements of the offence is proved. 1 0 5
The drawing of such inferences is in the discretion of the trial judge
given the particular facts and circumstances of the case.1 0 6 The
suspect still retains, however, a specific immunity from having the
prosecution comment adversely on the suspect's failure to answer
10 7
questions before or at trial.
Addressing Murray's claim that permitting use of his silence
against him rendered the right worthless and effectuated a means
of compelled self-incrimination, the Commission noted that the right
to silence in Article 6 was not unqualified.1 0 8 Under the standard
of analyzing the fairness of the case as a whole, the Commission
found no violation of Article 6(1) and (2) regarding Murray's

silence.' 0 9 It first remarked that there was no penalty imposed on

Murray for exercising his right to silence.1 10 While the Commission
recognized that the trial judge drew strong inferences against
Murray for remaining silent, this did not render the trial unfair for
a number of reasons. First, the prosecution had to put forth
sufficient evidence to constitute a prima facie case.1 1 1 Only then
was it permissible for the trial judge to draw inferences from the
accused's failure to rebut such evidence. 1 12 Second, the burden of
proof remained on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. 1 3 Third, the suspect was warned that if a prima
facie case was made out against him and that if he failed to respond,
inferences could be drawn against him. 114 Fourth, there was no
suggestion that he did not understand those warnings.1 15 The
Commission went on to find, however, that the suspect's rights were
violated by being denied access to a lawyer for over forty-eight
hours.116
The ECHR also ruled that there had been no violation of Article
6 with regard to the right to silence. 117 It noted that to base a
conviction solely or substantially on the inferences drawn from the

105. 1& at 39,
30 (citing R. v. Kevin Sean Murray, sub nom. Murray v.
Director of Public Prosecutions, 97 Cr. App. R. 151 (1993)).
106. Seeid. 31.
107. See id. 32 (citing R. v. Director of Serious Fraud Office, Ex Parte Smith,
3 W.L.R. 66 (1992)).
108.
See id. at 44, 56 (Commission Report).
109.
See id. at 46-47,
64, 65.
110. See id.at 44, 57.
111. See i. at 44-45, 58.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 45, 60.
115. See id.at 46, 62.
116. See id. at 48, 73.
117. See id. at 58, 58.
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accused's refusal to answer questions would clearly breach the
immunities inherent in Article 6.118 However, the ECHR deemed it
"equally obvious that these immunities cannot . . . prevent the

accused's silence, in situations which clearly call for an explanation
from him, be taken into account in assessing the pervasiveness of
the evidence adduced by the prosecution." 1 9 Like the Commission,
the ECHR found it notable that the accused was permitted to remain
silent throughout the trial. 120 It stated that, though there may be
a certain level of indirect compulsion to speak if inferences might be
drawn from silence, that factor alone cannot be decisive. 12 1 The
focus of the analysis must be on the role of such inferences in
influencing the proceeding and the conviction. 122
For the most part, the ECHR reiterated the Commission's
opinion regarding procedural safeguards and weight of the evidence
against the accused, which prevented a violation of Article 6.123 It
went on to state that in many countries where evidence is freely
assessed by judges, they are able to take into account all of the
relevant circumstances when assessing the case, including the
accused's behavior and the manner in which he conducted his
defense. 124 Furthermore, in this particular case, the trial was
conducted by an experienced judge who was required to put the
basis of his decision in writing, including why he chose to draw
25
inferences from the accused's silence.'
The provisions of the statute challenged in Murray, delineating
the use of the accused's silence, bear a close similarity to the silence
provisions in the CJTCA. Additionally, the CJTCA provides for use
of the accused's silence only after he has been extended the
opportunity to consult with a lawyer. 12 6 Thus, in some ways it
mitigates against the likelihood of a finding that a CJTCA trial would
be deemed "unfair" under Article 6. However, it appears that under
the CJTCA a terrorist suspect does not have a right to have his
lawyer present during interrogations, but rather, only to have been
given the chance to consult with the lawyer beforehand. 12 7 Thus,
the lawyer may have to advise his client about the implications of
the suspect's silence before an interrogation, the subject of which is
yet unknown to the lawyer. 128 Furthermore, if the lawyer is not

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See id. at 60, 47.
Id.
See id. at 61, 148.
See&iL. 50.
See id.
See id. at 61-64, fl 48-56.
See id. 1 54.
See id 51.
See CJTCA, supranote 4, ch. 40, § 1(4)-(5).
See i..
See Bindman, supra note 44.
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permitted to be present during the actual interrogation, the suspect
will be on his own in applying whatever legal principles were
12 9
imparted to him by his lawyer.
The ECHR reviewing Murray also seemed to place substantial
importance on the fact that in Northern Ireland, where judges sit
without juries in criminal trials, the experienced judge was required
to put in writing the basis of a decision to draw inferences from an
accused's silence.13 0 It is not clear whether the ECHR still would
have found the proceedings to be fair if a jury were charged with the
decision of whether to draw inferences from silence, especially
elsewhere in the United Kingdom where criminal suspects are
afforded jury trials. 13 1
B. "EqualityofArms" and the Prosecution'sDuty to
Disclose Evidence: The Tension Between the Right
to Cross-Examine Witnesses and Britain'sPublic
InterestImmunity
The ECHR has consistently held that the principle of "equality
of arms" inheres in the requirement that the accused be given a fair
trial under Article 6. Basically, this principle embodies the notion
that the accused should be afforded procedural equality with the
prosecution. Article 6 also explicitly provides that every person
charged with a criminal offense has the rights "to examine or have
examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions
32
as witnesses against him."'
Seemingly at odds with the idea of equality of arms and the
right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses is the prosecution's
right under British law to withhold information from the defense in
some circumstances. These circumstances usually occur when
disclosing certain information to the defense might jeopardize the
security of police or military operations or when an informer's or
witness's well-being might be at risk if his identity is disclosed to the
defense. This can pose a serious risk of unfairness, especially where
a police officer's opinion might be based on hearsay originating from
such informants and witnesses.

129.

See id.

130. See Murray, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 61-62, 51.
131. See Anthony F. Jennings, More Resounding Silence--Part2, 149 NEW L.J.
1232, 1233 (Aug. 6, 1999).
132. European Convention on Human Rights, supranote 6, art. 6(3)(d).
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1. Public Interest Immunity
Under British law, the prosecution must normally disclose "all
unused material... if it has some bearing on the offence(s) charged
and the surrounding circumstances of the case." 13 3 However, the
prosecution may decide not to disclose relevant information to the
defense on the grounds that disclosure would be contrary to the
public interest. This public interest immunity may be used to
protect the identity of informers for their own safety as well as to
ensure that authorities have a continuous supply of information
from these sources. 1 3 Particularly important to cases that might
involve the CJTCA are the Attorney General's Guidelines for the
prosecution. The Guidelines provide that statements containing
"sensitive material" may be withheld if it is not in the public interest
to disclose them. 13 5 A list of examples explicates that a statement
contains sensitive material if:
(a) It deals with matters of national security; or it is by, or discloses
the identity of, a member of the Security Services who would be of no
further use to those Services once his identity became known.
(b) It is by, or discloses the identity of, an informant and there are
reasons for fearing that disclosure of his identity would put him or his
family in danger.
(c) It is by, or discloses the identity of, a witness who might be in
danger of assault or intimidation if his identity became known.
(d) It contains details which, if they became known, might facilitate
the commission of other offences .. or it discloses some unusual
136
form of surveillance or method of detecting crime.
The Guidelines afford the police and the prosecution much
discretion in deciding whether disclosure is warranted. Thus, "[Ilf
... the material supports the case for the prosecution or is neutral
. . .there is a discretion to withhold not merely the statement
containing the sensitive material, but also the name and address of
the maker." 13 7 The guidelines provide that in deciding a disclosure
issue, a balance should be struck between the "degree of sensitivity"
and the extent to which the information would be helpful to the
defense.13 8 Any doubt as to whether the balance favors disclosure
or non-disclosure should be resolved in favor of disclosure. 13 9

133. Attorney General's Guidelines: Disclosure of Information to the Defence
in Cases to be Tried on Indictment, 74 Crim. App. 302 (1981), 2 [hereinafter A.G.
Guidelines].
134. See R. v. Hennessey, 68 Crim. App. 419, 425 (1978).
135. A.G. Guidelines, supra note 133, 6(v).
136. Id. 6(v)(a)-(d).
137. Id. 8.
138. See id.
139. See id. 9.
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The British courts have followed suit in applying the balancing
test to relevant evidence. According to case law, there is a general
rule in favor of protecting the identity of informers, but the court will
order disclosure if the information at issue may prove the
defendant's innocence or avoid a miscarriage of justice. 14 0 The
accused has the burden of proving that there is a 'good reason" why
his request for information should prevail over the need to protect
14 1
informers.

If a defendant requests that the prosecution disclose certain
information in its possession and the prosecution wishes to keep
this information confidential, the prosecution may make an ex parte
application to the trial judge to determine whether the information
must be disclosed. 142 In doing so, the prosecution is obliged to put
forth to the judge only such information that it deems "material."
Information is material if upon a "sensible appraisal" the
prosecution finds it:
(1) to be relevant or possibly relevant to an issue in the case;
(2) to raise or possibly raise a new issue whose existence is not
apparent from the evidence the prosecution proposes to use;
(3) to hold out a real (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of providing a
lead on evidence which goes to (1) or (2).143

It is up to the defense to make known to the prosecution any
defense or issues that the defense might potentially raise in order for
the prosecution to determine materiality. 14 4 The prosecution should
determine materiality based on the enumerated criteria and not
simply hand over all of its unused material to the court to determine
145
materiality.
Additionally, Article 6 guarantees the right to the necessary
facilities for conducting a defense, including, inter alia, "the
opportunity to acquaint himself... with the results of investigations
carried out throughout the proceedings" regardless of whom carried

140. See R. v. Keane, 2 All E.R. 478, 99 Crim. App. 1 (1994).
141. See Hennessey, 68 Crim. App. at 425.
142. See R. v. Davis, Rowe and Johnson, 2 All E.R. 643, 97 Crim. App. 110
(1993) (upholding the trial court's ruling that the defense could put positive
assertions to the chief inspector and inquire into sources of information on cross
examination, but it was for the witness to decide whether or not to answer without
divulging information, which the crown wished not to disclose); see also R. v.
Johnson, Davis and Roe, Mar. 29, 1999 (Crim. App.), availablein LEXIS, U.K. Cases
Library, Combined Courts File (terminating the order of public interest immunity
because the information at issue had recently become public).
143. R. v. Keane, 2 All E.R. at 484 (quoting R. v. Melvin and Dingle (20 Dec.
1993, unreported)).
144. See id.
145. See id.
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out the investigations. 1 4 6 This includes a right of access "to all
relevant elements that have been or could be collected by the
competent authorities." 4 7
However, an applicant alleging a
violation of this right must demonstrate that the facility to which he
was denied access was necessary to allow preparation of an
148
adequate defense.
The public interest immunity afforded police and military
personnel poses a significant problem for the defense in the context
of "opinion" testimony permitted by the CJTCA. For example, it is
likely that during direct examination at trial a senior police officer
will testify that in his opinion the accused is a member of a
proscribed organization. Assume the officer bases this opinion on
information received from informants or military intelligence
personnel and that which would amount to hearsay if the officer
were to disclose the information at trial. Permitting the use of such
opinion testimony allows what would otherwise be inadmissible
hearsay to become direct evidence that can be considered by the
judge or jury in determining the accused's guilt or innocence.
Furthermore, if some of these sources of information are informants
who would lack credibility were they to appear before the jury,
allowing the senior police officer to give testimony based on this
information lends credibility to an unreliable source.
Also assume that upon cross-examination, defense counsel
wisely attempts to inquire into the sources of the police officer's
testimony. At most, the officer may have revealed that such
information came from unidentified informants or intelligence
sources. Assume that on further inquiry about these sources by the
defense, the officer invokes public interest immunity and declines
to answer the questions. Whether the judge applies the balancing
test prior to trial or during trial in determining whether disclosure
should be ordered, in many of these situations it is likely that the
balance may favor non-disclosure. This is due to the nature of
prosecutions for terrorist offenses. They often involve information

146. Jespers v. Belgium, App. No. 8403/78, 22 Eur. Commn H.R. Dec. & Rep.
110, 121-22 (1980) (Commission report) (commenting on Article 6(3)(b)); see also
John Wadham, ProsecutionDisclosure, Crime and Human Rights, 147 NEw L.J. 697
(1997) (discussing potential conflicts between ECHR caselaw and restricted
prosecution disclosure under the Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act 1996).
147. Jespers, 22 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Doc. & Rep. at 12-22.
148. See GROTIAN, supra note 71, at 50,
114, which found no violation of
Article 6(1) where the applicant was denied access to the entirety of his customs file
in a prosecution for tax and customs offenses. Bendenoun v. France, 18 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 54 (1994). During the proceedings, the prosecution relied only on documentary
evidence which had been disclosed to the accused, and the accused knew the content
of most of the undisclosed documents. Id. at 76-77,
51, 52. The applicant failed
to give reasons why he was entitled to or required to access the documents at issue.).
Id. at 52.
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flowing from highly confidential intelligence sources such as MI5.
Also, there will be a great need to keep the identities of informers
confidential due to the reputation of certain paramilitary and
terrorist organizations of exacting revenge on informers.
Additionally, the permanent nature of many of these organizations
weigh in favor of keeping confidential all methods used by the police
and military in infiltrating an organization's operations. This
situation makes it even more difficult to put forth a viable request
for disclosure. In defending against the charge, the defense may
need to know the nature of the information relied upon by the police
before determining a defense strategy. At this point, the defense wil
not be able to raise issues that allow the prosecution to analyze
materiality.
2. The Right to Cross-Examine Witnesses Under Article 6
Despite the high degree of deference afforded national courts by
ECHR in matters concerning the admissibility of evidence, the ECHR
has found violations of Article 6 in numerous cases where either
hearsay evidence has been used at trial or the defense has not been
afforded an adequate opportunity to cross-examine key prosecution
witnesses. In most of these instances, the application to the
Commission was based on alleged violations of paragraph 1 taken
in conjunction with paragraph 3(d) of Article 6 of the Convention.
Paragraph 1 guarantees the right to a fair trial by an independent
and impartial tribunal, while paragraph 3(d) guarantees the accused
the right to cross-examine witnesses against him.
The ECHR has repeatedly stated that "the admissibility of
evidence is primarily a matter for regulation by national law and as
a general rule it is for the national courts to assess the evidence
before them." 1 49 As such, the ECHR will not undertake to assess
whether certain statements are legally admissible as evidence but
rather will determine whether the criminal proceedings taken as a
whole, including the way in which evidence is taken, were fair. 150
There is also a general rule that evidence must be produced at a
public trial, with the accused present, with a view toward adversarial
argument.' 5 ' While there are exceptions to this rule, the exceptions
must not infringe upon the right of the defendant to be given an
"adequate opportunity to challenge and question a witness against
him."'5 2 While the use of statements by an anonymous witness as
evidence supporting a conviction is not a per se violation of the

149.
(1998).
150.
151.
152.

Van Mechelen & Others v. Netherlands, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 647, 673,

Id. (citing Doorson v. Netherlands, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 330,
Id.

51.
See Ludi v. Switzerland, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 173, 1 47 (1993).

50

70 (1996).
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Convention, restrictions upon the accused's rights should be strictly
necessary and should not be permitted if there are less restrictive
3
15
means of furthering society's interest in witness anonymity.

Typical of the cases in which the accused challenges witness
anonymity and claims a denial of the right to cross-examine an
adverse witness is the 1998 judgment of the ECHR in Van Mechelen
& Others v. Netherlands. In a six to three decision, the ECHR held
that there had been a breach of Article 6(1) as well as Article 6(3)(d)
of the Convention. The two applicants' convictions for attempted
manslaughter and robbery were based largely on anonymous
testimony by police officers given outside the presence of the
accused.1 5 4 While Van Mechelen is not a case involving terrorism,
it is relevant in that the prosecution sought to keep the identity of
the police witnesses anonymous to protect the safety of officers and
their families and to protect the integrity and usefulness of the
155
officers in future undercover operations.
In Van Mechelen, the authorities had received a tip that the
defendants had been involved in numerous robberies., 5 6 A police
observation team staked out the caravan site from where the
defendants allegedly ran their operation.15 7 One night in January
1989, the police recorded the tag numbers of three cars-a BMW, a
Lancia, and a Mercedes-that left the site together around fivefifteen p.m.1 5 8 Forty-five minutes later a post office was robbed in
a nearby town.15 9 A Mercedes equipped with a steel girder was used
to break through the post office window, and a man wearing a black
balaclava helmet robbed the store at gunpoint.' 6 0 The Mercedes
was then set on fire and the robbers took off in a BMW. 16 1 The
police were alerted and followed the BMW to a sand track leading
into a nearby forest, where the pursuit ceased.' 6 2 They saw a pillar
of smoke come from the forest and later found the BMW in the
forest, burnt out. 16 3 Four police officers observed a red Lancia leave
the forest from the same path that the BMW used to enter it, and
they followed. 164 While chasing the Lancia, its trunk opened to
reveal two men who began shooting at the police with a pistol and

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See Van Mechelen, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep at 674,
Id. at 671, 47.
See id. 48.
Id. at 650.
See id.

158.

See i 110.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Seei,U
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

11.

58.
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a sub-machine gun.' 6 s The police finally caught up with the Lancia
when it came to a stop on a side road, where a man in the middle of
the road began firing at the police with a submachine gun. 16 6 One
of the policemen was hit, and the men in the Lancia were able to
escape. 1 6 7 The three cars involved in the robbery were subsequently
identified as the cars that had their tag numbers recorded at the
168
caravan site by the observation team.
Prior to the applicants' trial, the statements made by the four
police witnesses, who were identified only by a number, were
testified to by an identified police officer. 16 9 Upon a challenge by the
defense, the investigating judge determined that the unidentified
officers had "investigative competence" and as such the admissibility
of their statements was not affected by their anonymity. 170 The only
evidence given at trial identifying the applicants as the robbers were
the statements given by the anonymous officers, who did not
appear. 17 1 The applicants were convicted. 172 During proceedings
in the Court of Appeal, an identified civilian witness gave evidence
in open court, but the four police officers were permitted to give
evidence in
a
private
room with the judge and the
prosecutor. 173 The room was connected by sound link to the
defense. The court permitted the defense to put questions to the
anonymous witnesses through the judge. 1 74 The police witnesses
who were cross-examined in open court could not give positive
evidence identifying the applicants as the perpetrators of the
76
crime.I 7 5 The Court of Appeal convicted the applicants.1
The ECHR found the proceedings to be unfair under Article 6,
despite the Commission's finding to the contrary. 17 7 The ECHR
stated that while Article 6 does not explicitly account for the
interests of witnesses, it can be implied from other articles in the
convention that proceedings should be organized so as not to
"unjustifiably imperil" such persons. 178 It went on to say that when

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See id. at 650-51, 11.
See id. at 651, 11.
See id.
See id. 12.
See id. 13.
Id. 14.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 652, 16.
See id.
See id. 23.
See id. 26.
See id. 1I 65-66.
Id. 53. For example, Article 8 of the Convention provides that:

1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.
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anonymity is maintained, Article 6 requires that, because the
defense is disadvantaged by procedures that should not normally be
involved in criminal prosecutions, the disadvantage should be
counterbalanced by appropriate judicial procedures. 17 9 In any case,
to a decisive extent"
a conviction should not be based entirely "or
180
upon statements by anonymous witnesses.
The ECHR, upon reviewing Van Mechelen, noted that special
problems arise when balancing defense interests with the interest
in witness anonymity when the witnesses at issue are agents of the
state. 1 8 1 While police witnesses and their families also deserve
protection, their position as agents of the state and their usual ties
to the prosecution dictate that anonymity should only be maintained
in exceptional circumstances. 1 82 Also, the ECHR noted that giving
evidence in open court, especially by arresting officers, is usually a
natural part of an officer's duty. 8 3 While the ECHR recognized that
it might be legitimate for an undercover officer to remain anonymous
so long as the defendant's rights were respected,' 8 4 this should only
be permitted where strictly necessary and where alternative
methods less restrictive to the defendant's rights are unavailable.18 5
According to the ECHR, the fact that the anonymous officers in
Van Mechelen were in a separate room connected only by sound link
to the defense with the investigating judge posing questions deprived
the defense of its ability to observe the officers' demeanor under

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety.... for
the prevention of disorder or crime .... or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 8. From these provisions,
the Court appears to imply a general duty to protect the well being of witnesses in
criminal trials.
179. See Van Mechelen, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. At 673, 53 (citing Doorson, 22 Eur
H. R. Rep. 330, 1 70). The court does not explicitly state of what those
counterbalancing procedures should consist. In Doorson, however, the court found
that although the two anonymous witnesses identifying the applicant as the
perpetrator of the crime were heard outside of the applicant's presence, the handicap
to the defense was counterbalanced by the fact that 1) the witnesses were questioned
by an investigating judge at the appeals stage, in the presence of the defense counsel,
2) the judge knew the identities of the witnesses, and 3) the witnesses identified the
applicant from a photograph which the applicant acknowledged to be of himself. See
Doorson, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. At 349, 11 73-76. See infra notes 189-95 and
accompanying text.
180. Van Mechelen, 25 Eur. H. R. Rep. at 674, 55.
181. See id. 56.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. 1 57 (citing LIdi v. Switzerland, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 173, 49).
185.
See id. 1 58.

248

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

/VoL 33:221

direct questioning.1 8 6 The government argued that because the
witnesses were interrogated by an investigating judge, who tested
the witnesses' reliability and gave a written report of his finding of
reliability and reasons for maintaining anonymity, the disadvantage
to the defense was counterbalanced by appropriate procedures. 18 7
The ECHR rejected this argument, stating that the disadvantage was
not counterbalanced because of the defense's inability to crossexamine the witness in its presence and make its own judgment
regarding demeanor and reliability.18 8 Because the only positive
identification evidence linking the applicants to the crime was by
these anonymous officers, the ECHR held that the conviction rested
to a "decisive extent" on these anonymous statements and thus,
rendered the trial unfair under Article 6.189
The Van Mechelen opinion distinguished itself from Doorson v.
Netherlands, decided two years earlier, in which the use of
statements by anonymous witnesses was held not to be unfair.190
The applicant in Doorsonwas convicted for drug trafficking and was
denied the opportunity at trial to question anonymous witnesses
whose statements identifying the applicant as the perpetrator were
admitted.19 1 However, on appeal the applicant's counsel was given
the opportunity to cross-examine two of these witnesses, even
though the applicant himself was not permitted in the room.1 92
Furthermore, the only witness who was not cross-examined during
the course of the entire proceedings could not be found and brought
in to testify, justifying the use of his statement as corroborative
evidence only.193 Additionally, there was a finding by the ECHR of
a substantial threat of reprisal against the anonymous witnesses.' 9 4
Various other witnesses who were heard in open court had identified
the applicant as the perpetrator in the Doorson case. 195 The ECHR
found by a vote of seven votes to two that there had been no
violation of Article 6(1) taken together with Article 6(3)(d). 19 6 The
ECHR found that the handicaps to the defense were appropriately
counterbalanced because (1) the witnesses were questioned by an

186. See i.
59.
187. See id. 62.
188. See id.
189. Id. 1 63, 66. The Court also noted that the prosecution failed to establish
that less restrictive alternatives, such as disguising the witnesses while in court,
could achieve the same protection.- The prosecution also did not establish a real
threat of reprisals against the officers. See id
60-6 1.
190. See id. 64; Doorson, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 350, 83.
191. See id. at 335-36,
19-20.
192. See id. 25.
193. See i.
79-80.
194. Id. 71.
195. Id.
196. See i& 83.
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investigating judge in the presence of defense counsel, (2) the judge
knew the witnesses identities, and (3) the witnesses identified the
applicant from a photograph that the applicant acknowledged to be
197
himself.
Van Mechelen and Doorson together set out the rules and
principles developed in much of the ECHR's case law under Article
6(3)(d) related to examination of witnesses and disclosure of
evidence in the hands of the prosecution. 198 The right to crossexamine witnesses is closely related to the duty of the prosecution
to disclose information, as they both are crucial to the principle of
"equality of arms" espoused by the ECHR.
What appears from the case law is a general rule that
convictions based to a significant extent on testimony by anonymous
witnesses, whom the defense is not able to cross-examine, breach
Article 6.
The ECHR will likely tolerate convictions based on
anonymous witness testimony that cannot be cross-examined where
there is a heavy interest in favor of preventing the witnesses from
appearing at trial, coupled with a significant amount of corroborative
evidence which the defense can adequately challenge during trial.19 9

197. See id.
73-76. See supranote 179 and accompanying text.
198. Among the cases in which the ECHR has found no violation of Articles 6(1)
and 6(3)(d) taken together is Asch v. Austria, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 597 (1993) (holding
that where statement of defendant's co-habitee given soon after the defendant's
arrest was admitted into evidence after co-habitee refused to testify, no violation
because defendant failed to cross-examine the police officer who took the report and
failed to call other witnesses in his behalf.). The Court has, however, found violations
in numerous other cases. See Delta v. France, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 574 (1993) (robbery
conviction based solely on written statements of the victim and a friend, and court
denied defendant's request to call these witnesses); Saidi v. France, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep.
251 (1993) (conviction based on the identification evidence of three persons, and
applicant's requests to examine these witnesses repeatedly denied.); Windisch v.
Austria, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 281 (1991) (conviction based largely on statements by two
anonymous witnesses heard only by the police, in the absence of the defense, and
not appearing at trial); Kotovski v. Netherlands, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 434 (1990)
(robbery conviction based to a decisive extent on statements by two anonymous
witnesses who were heard by the police in the absence of defense counsel and did not
appear at trial, although one of the witnesses was examined by an examining
magistrate in the absence of defense counsel). See generallyJohn Wadham & Janet
Arkinstall, HearsayEvidence and the Use of Anonymous Wdinesses, 149 NEw L.J. 703
(1999) (discussing the ECHR's treatment of the use of anonymous witnesses and the
requirement of disclosure).
199. For an approach similar to that taken by the European Court of Human
Rights, see Mercedeh Momeni, Balancing the ProceduralRights of the Accused Against
a Mandateto Protect V'ctims and Witnesses: An Examinationof the Anonymity Rules of
the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 41 How. L.J. 155, 157
(1997) (citing International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Decisionon
the Prosecutor'sMotion Requesting ProtectiveMeasuresfor Victims and Witnesses, (Aug.
10, 1995) <http:www.un.org/icty/ 100895pm.htm>). The article discusses the test
employed by the Tribunal:
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The balancing process weighs heavily in favor of the defendant's
rights. While the ECHR has not directly addressed the issue of
Britain's public interest immunity, the Commission has already
indicated, albeit in an unreported decision, that non-disclosure to
the defense on some public interest immunity grounds violates the
right to a fair trial in Article 6.200
3. "Equality of Arms" and the Prosecution's Duty of Disclosure
under Article 6(1)
The concept of equality of arms essentially requires that the
accused be given procedural rights equal to those of the prosecution
in the course of criminal proceedings. The ECHR has held that this
is inherent in the concept of a fair trial. 2 0 ' More specifically, it has
noted that Article 6(3)(d) of the Convention exemplifies the principle
of equality of arms with regard to the right to call witnesses as
between the prosecution and the defense. The Commission has
noted that the prosecution also has a duty to disclose relevant
material to the defense, 20 2 but this is limited by the principle that
the admissibility of evidence is generally a matter for the national
courts to assess themselves. 20 3 Thus, the overall "fairness" test still
applies.

On the basis of generally recognized principles of international law... a fiveprong balancing test must be met in order for a request of anonymity of
witnesses to be granted. The five prongs to be met are: (1) the existence of a
real fear for the safety of a witness; (2) the testimony of the witness must be
sufficiently relevant and important to the case; (3) there must be no prima
facie evidence of the witness's unworthiness in any way; (4) the non-existence
of a witness protection program; (5) the unavailability of less restrictive
protective measures.
Id200. See Wadham & Arkinstall, supra note 198 (discussing the Commission's
finding in Rowe & Davis v. United Kingdom, an unreported March 1999 decision, that
in some circumstances PH and the holding of private ex parte hearings is a breach
of the right to a fair trial).
201. See Foucher v. France, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 234, 1 34 (1997) (holding that
there was a violation of Articles 6(1) and 6(3)(d) taken together where applicant was
denied access to his case file to procure relevant documents under a policy that
copies could not be issued to individuals who had declined counsel, an noting that
'equality of arms" is a feature of the wider concept of a fair trial); Bulut v. Austria, 24
Eur. H.R. Rep. 84, 103-04 (1996) (holding that d[elach party must be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present his case under conditions that do not place him
at a disadvantage vis-a-vis his opponent.").
202.
See Jespers v. Belgium, App. No. 8403/78, 22 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 100 (1981) (holding that prosecution must disclose potentially exculpatory
material, including information that might undermine the credibility of prosecution
witnesses, in order to make up for the inequality of resources between the
prosecution and the defense.).
203. See Edwards v. United Kingdom, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 417 (1992).
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An example of a violation of the principle of equality of arms
occurred in the case of B6nisch v. Austri. 2 ° 4 In B6nisch, the
applicant ran a firm that specialized in meat smoking.2 0 5 The
applicant was criminally prosecuted under Austrian food regulations
for allegedly using a process of smoking meats that created a
dangerously high level of the carcinogenic substance benzopyrene,
having an unacceptably high water content, and subsequently
distributing the product.20 6 Prior to filing charges, the Vienna food
inspectors had taken samples of the applicants' meat because they
had received a number of complaints. 20 7 The inspectors gave the
samples to the Federal Food Control Institute.20 8 The Institute
found the high benzopyrene concentrations after testing and turned
its opinion over to the city, which subsequently turned the results
20 9
over to the prosecutor so that charges could be filed.
At Bbnisch's trial in Regional Court, the trial judge appointed as
an expert witness the director of the Institute, the body whose
findings led to the filing of charges. 21 0 B~nisch challenged both the
expert and the judge on the grounds that the two had disregarded
the rights of the defense.2 1 1 B6nisch sought to introduce another
witness as an expert to counter the director's testimony, but the
2 12
court would only hear B~nisch's witness as an ordinary witness.
He claimed that his right to the attendance and examination of
witnesses and experts for the defense on the same grounds as those
for the prosecution was violated in contravention of Article 6 and
213
requested that several defense experts be heard.
The judge heard the testimony of the defense witness, the
director of another meat-analyzing institute.2 14
This witness
disputed the findings of the court's expert, claiming that the
benzopyrene level in the meat was much lower than what the court's
expert found.2 1 5 After hearing the rebuttal testimony of the court's
expert, the trial judge convicted B6nisch of the charges. 2 16 On
appeal, B6nisch challenged the appointment of the court expert on
the grounds that the trial court appointed the same person as an

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 191 (1987).
Seei&. 7.
See iU.
8-9.
See id. 8.
See id. 9.
See iL 10.
Seeid. 11.
Seeid.
See id. 1 11, 14.
See id.
See id. 12.
SeeidSee i.
13.
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expert who had reported B6nisch's case to the prosecutor.2 17 He
further claimed that his rights were not respected because his
witness was only heard as a defense witness, whereas the director
of the Institute was heard as an expert witness. 2 18 Based on
detailed explanations of the expert, the Vienna Court of Appeal
rejected B6nisch's appeal. 2 19 Additional similar charges were later
brought against B6nisch for another food contamination incident;
he was convicted, and his appeal on the same grounds was
2 20
rejected.
The ECHR found a violation of Article 6.221 In doing so, it noted
that while Article 6(3)(d) does not explicitly refer to experts but only
to witnesses against the accused, the provisions of Article 6(3)(d)
were "constituent elements, amongst others, of the concept of a fair
trial set forth in paragraph 1" of Article 6.222 Thus, the ECHR took
note of the accused's right under Article 6(3)(d), but analyzed the
criminal proceedings under the more general provisions of Article
6(1).223
The ECHR rejected the government's contention that because
the court appointed expert was a "neutral and impartial auxiliary of
the court" under Austrian law and was appointed by the court itself,
the expert was not a witness against the accused for purposes of
Article 6.224 The ECHR agreed with the Commission and the
applicant that the director of the Institute was not "an 'expert' in the
classic sense of the term," but rather a witness against the accused
within the meaning of Article 6.225 The director-later appointed as
the expert-drafted the Institute reports that led to the filing of
charges against the applicant. Later, as an appointed expert, he
was charged by the court with "'explaining and supplementing the
findings or opinion' of the Institute."2 2 6 Thus, the director by all
appearances was a witness against the accused and, as such, the
principle of equality of arms dictated that the Austrian courts afford
equal treatment between hearing the court-appointed expert and

217. See id. 14.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
15-18.
221.
See id. 35.
222. Id. 29 (citing Artico v. Italy, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 32 (1980); Goddi v.
Italy, App. No. 8966/80, 6 Eur. H.R. Rep. 457 28 (1984); Collozza v. Italy, App. No.
9024/80, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 516, 26 (1985)).
223. Bdnisch, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 191, 1 29.
224. Id. 30. The Court also stated that it was not going to re-define 'expert"
under Austrian law. Rather, the Court could not rely exclusively on the Austrian
terminology in analyzing the role of the court appointed expert, 'but must have
regard to the procedural position he occupied and ... the manner in which he
performed his function." Id. 31.
225. Id. 30.
226. Id. 31.
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hearing "persons who were or could be called, in whatever capacity,
22 7
by the defence."

For a number of reasons, the ECHR found that the accused was
not afforded equal treatment in the proceedings against him. First,
because the director was appointed as an expert under Austrian law
and "formally invested with the function of neutral and impartial
auxiliary," his statements carried greater weight than any witnesses
called by the accused. 2 28 However, in this case the director's
neutrality and impartiality were open to doubt. 2 29 Second, the
expert was able to attend all of the proceedings, question witnesses
and the accused, and comment on the evidence of these
witnesses. 23 0 Third, the witness called by the accused was subject
to examination by the judge as well as by the director. The
witnesses called by the defense, on the other hand, had no
opportunity to examine the director. 23 1 Fourth, the applicant was
not able to have a counter-expert appointed.2 3 2 Finally, if the court
needed clarification regarding the Institute's opinion, it had to get it
from another member of the Institute's staff and could not consult
another expert, except in limited circumstances inapplicable to the
23 3
case at hand.
While the principle of equality of arms appears general in
concept and application, it may influence how both the British
Courts and the ECHR analyze challenges to prosecutions under the
CJTCA, especially with regard to any "opinion" testimony given by
high-ranking police officers against the accused. The equality of
arms principle, though, seems to underlie some of the decisions of
the ECHR in cases discussed earlier in this Note, even though it may
not have been mentioned explicitly. At the very least, it represents
an argument that some criminal defendants can fall back on where
there is the appearance of unfairness in the proceedings and the
more specific provisions of Article 6 or decisions of the ECHR are not
directly applicable.

227. Id. 32.
228. Id. 33.
229. See id. Expert witnesses in Austrian proceedings can attend all of the
hearings, question witnesses, including the accused, and in some circumstances may
comment on the testimony given by other witnesses. Ordinary witnesses may not
engage in this activity. See 0230. See id.
231.
See id.
232.
See id. 34.
233.
See id.
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C. The EuropeanConvention on Human Rights and the Human
Rights Act: Interpretationsby the British Courts
Although the Human Rights Act (HRA) does not yet have the
force of law throughout the United Kingdom, British courts have
begun hearing challenges to criminal convictions under Article 6.
The recent cases of Ex ParteKebilene, R. v. Radak, and R. v. Thomas
& Others may provide the basis of the British judiciary's
interpretations of the HRA.
1. The Presumption of Innocence under Article 6
The Court of Appeal (the High Court) recently examined certain
provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and their
compatibility with the HRA. In R. v. Dir.Of Public Prosecutions,Ex
ParteKebilene & Others; R. v. Same, Ex Parte Rechach, the court
held that §§ 16A and 16B of the PTA conflicted with Article 6
because they undermined the presumption of innocence. 23 4 Section
16A essentially makes it a crime for a person to possess any
materials that give rise to a "reasonable suspicion" that the article
is being possessed for "a purpose connected with the commission,
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism" outside of the United
Kingdom or connected with Northern Ireland. 2 35 The PTA creates a
presumption that materials are in the person's possession if the
person and the materials are present in any premises or where the
materials are in the premises occupied by that person. 23 6 In this
case, the applicants had been charged with possessing chemical
containers, radio equipment, manuals, documents, credit cards, and
money under circumstances raising the suspicion that they were in
the applicants' possession for a purpose connected with
terrorism. 2 3 7 Section 16B makes it a crime to collect, record, or
possess any information or documents containing information, "of
a nature as is likely to be useful to terrorists in planning or carrying

234. R. v. Dir. Of Public Prosecutions, Ex Parte Kebilene & Others; R. v. Same,
Ex Parte Rechachi (hearing date: Mar. 30, 1999) (C.A.), available in THE TIMES
(London), Mar. 31, 1999. The House of Lords later overruled Ex Parte Kebilene on
purely procedural grounds. See R. v. Dir. of Public Prosecutions, Ex Parte Kebilene
& Others (hearing dates: July 19-22, Oct. 28, 1999) (H.L.), available in THE TIMES
(London), Oct. 28, 1999; infra note 240 and accompanying text.
235. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, Ch. 4, §§
16A(1), 16A(2) (Eng.).
236. See id. § 16A(4).
237. See R. v. Dir. Of Public Prosecutions, Ex Parte Kebilene & Others; R. v.
Same, Ex Parte Rechachi (hearing date: Mar. 30, 1999) (C.A.), availablein THE TIMES
(London), Mar. 31, 1999.
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out any act of terrorism." 23 8 One of the applicants was charged
under this provision for possessing books containing information of
such a nature that they were likely to be useful in planning or
carrying out a terrorist attack. 23 9 In reviewing the decision of the
Director of Public Prosecutions to prosecute the applicants, the High
Court decided that it could also review the substantive challenges
to the PTA provisions, since they were relevant to the decision to
prosecute in the interim between the passage of the HRA and its
240
effective date of application.
In judicial review proceedings, the High Court noted that these
provisions of the PTA criminalized the possession of otherwise
innocent materials and placed the burden on the defendant of
disproving a substantial element of the charge-mens rea.2 4 1 The

government did not need to prove the purpose for which the
information was possessed. 2 42 The High Court noted that the
presumption of innocence is breached when the accused could be
convicted even though a reasonable doubt exists as to a material
fact.2 43

The High Court pointed out that a defendant who chose not

to present evidence could be convicted without the government
having to prove the mens rea of the offense. 2 4 4 Thus, the accused
could be convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to
whether the accused had criminal intent. 2 45 According to the High
Court, this undermined the presumption of innocence guaranteed
in Article 6.246 It stopped short of addressing the issue of whether
there was any way that §§ 16A and 16B could be read so as to be
compatible with Article 6.247

238. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, Ch.4, § 16B(1)
(Eng.).
239. R. v. Dir. Of Public Prosecutions, Ex Parte Kebilene & Others; R. v. Same,
Ex Parte Rechachi (hearing date: Mar. 30, 1999) (C.A.), available in THE TIMES
(London), Mar. 31, 1999.
240.
See id. The House of Lords overruled this judicial review of the decision
to prosecute, holding that the criminal trial should be permitted to proceed. See R.
v. Dir. of Public Prosecutions, Ex Parte Kebilene & Others (hearing dates: July 19-22,
Oct. 28, 1999) (H.L.), availableinTHETIMES (London), Oct. 28, 1999. The Lords noted
that whether the Prevention of Terrorism Act conflicted with the Convention was an
issue that should be argued by the prosecution and defense in open court. See id.
They also asserted, however, that the courts should start taking account of
convention principles. See id.
241. R. v. Dir. Of Public Prosecutions, Ex Parte Kebilene & Others; R. v. Same,
Ex Parte Rechachi (hearing date: Mar. 30, 1999) (C.A.), available in THE TIMES
(London), Mar. 31, 1999.
242.
See i.
243.
See id.
244. See id.
245.

See id.

246.

See id.

247.

See id.
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Ex Parte Kebilene demonstrates the impact that the HRA will
have on anti-terrorism laws when it comes into effect.
The
provisions of the CJTCA that permit inferences from a suspect's
silence might be challenged on the basis that they create a
presumption of both criminal intent and culpability for the actus
reas when an accused fails to mention a material fact, albeit in a
less blatant manner than §§ 16A and 16B of the PTA. As in Ex Parte
Kebilene, the accused could arguably be convicted simply on the
basis of his inaction, despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as
to criminal intent or the actus reas.
2. The Right to Cross-Examine Witnesses under Article 6 in
British Trials
In R. v. Thomas; R. v. Flannagan,the prosecution was allowed
to read to the jury from a witness's statement and deposition
because the witness feared giving evidence in open court. 2 48 The
appellants argued that this breached Article 6, which, although it
was not yet domestic law, should be considered by the court.2 4 9 The
2 SO
two appellants had been convicted of drug and assault charges.
Besides the statements read to the jury, there was substantial
testimonial evidence from other witnesses and medical evidence
substantiating the prosecution's charges. 25 1
Additionally, the
witness had testified before the judge in pre-trial proceedings and
convinced the judge of the danger posed to the witness in the event
that he testified in open court. 25 2 The judge invited defense counsel
to cross-examine the witness during this proceeding, but defense
counsel did not take advantage of the opportunity.25 3 The witness
was cross-examined in the magistrate's court, and at trial the judge
warned the jury of the dangers of reliance upon statements from a
25 4
witness who did not appear at trial.
The Court of Appeal held that given the narrow grounds under
which the statement was admitted, it did not render the trial unfair
under Article 6.255 In doing so, it relied on the ECHR's decision in
Kotovski v. Netherlands25 6 and the Commission's opinion in Trivedi

248. R. v. Thomas (C); R. v. Flannagan; R. v. Thomas (F); R. v. Smith, 1998
Crim. L. Rep. 887 (hearing dates: June 19, 1998) (C.A.), available in THE TIMES
(London), July 7, 1998; see also Susan Nash & Mark Furse, Human Rights Law
Update: The Human Rights Act 1998, 148 NEW L. J. 1782, 1782 (1998).
249.
See R. v. Thomas, 1998 Crim. L. Rep. 887.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. App. No. 11454/85, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 434 (1990).
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v. UK,2 5 7 which in the court's view permitted the use at trial of pretrial statements
of non-testifying witnesses
in
limited
circumstances. 2 58 The Kotovski Court found a violation of Article 6
where (1) the conviction was based to a decisive extent on
statements by witnesses who did not appear at trial but made
statements to police in the absence of defense counsel, and (2) there
was no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. 2 59 In Trivedi,
the Commission found no violation of Article 6 where statements 60
of
2
a witness who had become too ill to testify were presented at trial.
At trial, the defense was permitted to attack the credibility and
reliability of the witness's statements by commenting upon them in
front of the jury, and the judge directed the jury to accord less
weight to such witness's statements than to the testimony of witness
who appeared at trial.2 6 1 Relying on these authorities, the Court of
Appeal concluded that the admission of the statements did not
breach the Convention because the defense had the opportunity to
cross-examine the witness in pre-trial proceedings and because
26 2
other evidence substantially supported the conviction.
In R. v. Radak; a prosecution witness refused to travel from the
United States to the United Kingdom to testify, and the trial court
admitted the witness's written statement.26 3 Without the witness's
statement, the prosecution would have had to dismiss the
indictment for money laundering because the statement was
essential to establish the actus reas.2 6 After considering whether
the defendant's lack of opportunity to cross-examine the witness at
trial could result in a serious lack of unfairness, the Court of Appeal
held that the risk of unfairness to the defendant required exclusion
under the applicable evidentiary statute and under Article 6(3)(d) of
26 5
the Convention.
These two cases demonstrate the amenability of the British
courts to challenges based on the Convention, even in the interim
period before the HRA becomes effective. Convictions under the
CJTCA may be challenged in the same manner between now and
October 2000.
Substantively, the cases create common law
precedent incorporating Convention guarantees into British law in
advance of the statutory mandate of the HRA.

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

No. 31700/96, 89 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Doc. 3 Rep. 136 (1977).
See R. v. Thomas, 1998 Crim. L. Rep. 887.
App. No. 11454/86, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 434,
44,45.
No. 31700/96, 89 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Doc. 3 Rep. 136 (1977).
Id.
See R. v. Thomas, 1998 Crim. L. Rep. 887.
1 Crim. App. 187, 1999 Crim. L. Rep. 223 (1999).
See id.
See id.
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V. THE CJTCA IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: THE NEED FOR REPEAL, OR
ALTERNATIVELY, A NARROW INTERPRETATION

The Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act (CJTCA),
when applied in practice, may undermine the rights guaranteed by the
HRA. The HRA provisions include the guarantee to the presumption
of innocence, the implied right to silence, the right to facilities
necessary to the preparation of an adequate defense, the right to
equality of arms, and the overall analysis of whether the accused has
been afforded a fair trial. These provisions cast doubt upon the validity
of criminal proceedings utilizing the evidentiary provisions of the
CJTCA. While some trials under the CJTCA may be "fair" despite
restrictions on these rights, many trials will not be, and the legislation
is likely to give rise to much litigation when the HRA becomes effective
throughout the United Kingdom. Accordingly, British judges will, at a
minimum, have to construe provisions of the CJTCA very narrowly in
order to reconcile criminal proceedings against terrorism suspects with
the rights already guaranteed by the Convention and soon to be
guaranteed by the HRA.
A. The CJTCA Should Be Repealed Because Its Combination
of Changes to CriminalProceedingsAgainst Terrorist
Suspects Will Contravenethe Convention and,
Accordingly, the Human Rights Act
Several provisions of the CJTCA run afoul of Article 6 of the
Human Rights Convention because they violate specific rights
inherent in a fair trial as enumerated in Article 6. First, the
provisions allowing inferences to be drawn from a suspect's silence
and allowing opinion evidence from a senior police officer shift the
burden of proof, compelling the defendant to prove his innocence.
Also, by permitting police officers to assert the public interest
immunity privilege, the CJTCA violates the equity of arms principle
and the defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses, and allows for
convictions based on evidence lacking any credibility.
To begin with, the CJTCA allows a judge or jury to draw
inferences from the silence of the accused concerning a fact that is
"materially related" to an offense for which he is being investigated.
This applies to the accused's silence both during interrogation and
at trial. A compounding threat to the fairness of the proceeding is
the fact that under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), which the
CJTCA's procedural provisions supplement, suspects can be
26 6
detained for up to seven days before being charged with a crime.

266. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, Ch. 4, § 14(4),
14(5) (Eng.).
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During the first forty-eight hours of detention, there is no right to a
lawyer or to a phone call. 2 67 The PTA is already infamous because
of the instances of beatings and even torture suffered by suspects
at the hands of police. But even without physical abuse, detention
for such a long period obviously leaves the door open for intense
psychological pressures. 2 68 Permitting these inferences does not
alone render a trial "unfair" according to the ECHR. However, it
places an additional burden on the defendant in that it does
effectively "compel" the defendant, if only indirectly, to answer
questions posed by the police or the prosecution.
The CJTCA does require that there be additional evidence
besides the suspect's silence in order to convict, but it is not clear
what additional evidence will suffice. The statute does not elaborate
on this point. Can the opinion evidence of a senior police officer,
along with the accused's silence, constitute sufficient evidence to
support a conviction? Under both British case law and ECHR case
law, this seems unlikely, but certainly not impossible.
The
prosecution must demonstrate a prima facie case against the
defendant under the ECHR's case law, and probably under British
case law, as a prerequisite for permitting the defendant's silence to
be used against him. A crucial question becomes what a prima facie
case might consist of under the CJTCA.
The CJTCA, read on its face, certainly does not prohibit a
conviction based upon a combination of the senior police officer's
opinion testimony and adverse inferences drawn from the accused's
silence. In separate sections, it does prohibit the accused from
being committed to trial on the basis of only one of these two
evidentiary pieces. 2 6 9 For the accused to be committed to trial
based upon the senior police officer's testimony, there must also be
other corroborative evidence. The rule is the same for committing
the accused to trial based partly on the accused's failure to mention
facts material to the charge. Thus, theoretically, the accused's
silence could corroborate the opinion testimony of the senior police
officer, and vice versa.

267. See John Wadham & Janet Arldnstall, Right to a FairTrial, 149 NEW L.J.
436 (Mar. 26, 1999) (asserting that any restrictions upon an accused's right of access
to a lawyer probably violate Article 6 under the Court's holding in Murray that there
is a right to counsel where there can be adverse consequences from a suspect's
demeanor during interrogation); see also Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions)
Act, 1991, ch. 24, § 45(1), (5)-(6) (Eng.).
268. See Martin S. Flaherty, Interrogation,Legal Advice, and Human Rights in
NorthernIreland, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 1, 2-5 (describing pressures such as
prolonged detention without access to a lawyer and other harsh conditions, as well
as a system of emergency laws designed to obtain convictions primarily through
statements and confessions obtained during interrogation).
269. See CJTCA, supranote 4, ch. 40, §§ 1, 2A(3)(b), 2A(6)(b).
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Such a reading would seem clearly at odds with Article 6 of the
Convention and the case law emanating from it. It would effectively
shift the burden of proof. The opinion testimony is essentially an
allegation against the defendant, 2 70 even though the CJTCA permits
its consideration as substantive evidence. Mere inaction when faced
with the allegation forces the accused to prove his innocence. The
only evidence at trial is an allegation by the government and an
inference drawn from the inaction of the accused. Thus, the British
courts should at least require other hard, direct evidence that first
establishes a prima facie case before admitting the police opinion
testimony and inferences from the accused's silence.
Even if British courts do read the CJTCA in such a way as to
make it compatible with the Convention by requiring more than the
police officer's opinion testimony and the accused's silence, this
does not necessarily render a trial "fair" for the purposes of Article
6. In most cases, there will be some other corroborative evidence
consisting of either eyewitness testimony or physical evidence. To
bring the trial within the realm of fairness as required by the
Convention, the conviction cannot be based to a substantial extent
on the accused's silence. 2 71 However, Murray does allow the
accused's failure to respond where the evidence against him clearly
calls for an explanation to be taken into account in assessing the
pervasive evidence against him. 27 2 It is in this area that the British
judges will have to fill the looming gaps in the CJTCA with judicial
requirements of substantial direct evidence, enough to constitute a
prima facie case, besides the police opinion testimony and the
accused's silence. This would go a long way toward compliance with
the basic requirements of Article 6 and the judgments of the ECHR
in cases like Murray. This assumes, however, that judges will be
willing to impose requirements that are not explicitly in the statute
and seem to go against the general policy of the CJTCA. Also, it
assumes that British judges hearing CJTCA cases will attempt to
comply with the guarantees of the Convention, even though they will
not be bound by the HRA until October 2000-except for Scotland,
273
where the HRA is already in effect.

270.

As Donald Findlay, supranote 1, points out:

An allegation is not evidence-though try telling that to the baying crowds
who hurl abuse at those who have been no more than accused of a crime
which is deemed to be particularly offensive or antisocial. Evidence consists
of facts, hard facts which lead to proof of an allegation to that most
fundamental standard-beyond a reasonable doubt.
271. See Murray v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, 42, 47 (1996).
272. See id. at 45, 60.
273. One of the problems posed by these two pieces of legislation is the
potential for disparate treatment of similar defendants, in that those tried under the
CJTCA before the Human Rights Act becomes effective will be tried before courts that
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Additionally, the single factor of permitting police officers to
assert a public interest immunity privilege while giving opinion
testimony will render trials unfair under Article 6 for a number of
reasons. First, it violates the general principle of equality of arms,
which the ECHR recognizes as inherent in Article 6. To prohibit the
defense from inquiring into the underlying basis of such testimony
puts the defendant at a major disadvantage vis-&-vis the
prosecution. The defendant will be prevented from challenging any
factual basis for that opinion whenever the police officer asserts the
privilege.2 7 4 In some instances, it will prevent the defendant from
accessing witnesses who may have potentially exculpatory
information about the offenses charged, in contravention of the
275
Also, it
principles of disclosure espoused by the Commission.
may prevent the defendant from ever finding out whether the
information upon which the officer based his testimony was
27 6
obtained through illegal means.
Second, when the police officer's opinion is based upon what he
has been told by other persons, whether they be eyewitnesses or
police or military personnel conducting the investigation, the specific
right of the defendant to cross-examine witnesses against him is
violated. The ability of the senior police officer to testify that in his
opinion the accused is a member of a terrorist organization, based
on this confidential information, becomes a vehicle for admitting
2 77
It
evidence that would otherwise be non-admissible hearsay.

do not yet have the power to enforce Convention Rights in the face of the
Parliamentary mandate of the CJTCA. See CJTCA, supra note 4, ch. 40; Human
Rights Act, supra note 7, ch. 42. However, the British courts are already taking into
account the provisions of the Convention in some cases. See R. v. Thomas (C); R. v.
Flannagan; R. v. Thomas (F); R. v. Smith, 1998 Crim. L. Rep. 887 (hearing dates:
June 19, 1998) (C.A.), available inTHETIMES (London), July 7, 1998; R. v. Radak, 1
Crim. App. 187, Crim. L. Rep. 223 (Crim. App.) (1999); see also Susan Nash & Mark
Furse, Human Rights Law Update: The Human Rights Act 1998, 148 NEw L. J. 1782
(1998).
274. See More HasteLess Speed, 148 NEw L.J. 1293, (1998):
[W]orse still is the further introduction of hearsay evidence. A senior police
officer may now give evidence of a suspect's membership in a proscribed
organisation. Effectively he will not be able to be cross-examined on his
beliefs. He may hide his sources on the grounds that national security will
be prejudiced and he can also hide behind the Public Interest immunity
certificate.
275. See Jespers v. Belgium, App. No. 8403/78, 22 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 100 (1980).
276. See John Harrison & Stephen Cragg, Police Complaints and PublicInterest
Immunity, 144 NEw L.J. 1064 (July 29, 1994) (stating that "[u]sed too freely [public
interest immunity] is a gift to secretive bureaucrats, louche politicians, and other
agents of the state who seek to shield their questionable conduct from public scrutiny
and accountability before the law.').
277. See More Haste Less Speed, supranote 274.
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prevents the accused from cross-examining those with first-hand
knowledge of the "facts."2 78 Thus, both the factfinder and the
defendant lose the opportunity of having the credibility of the
2 79
defendant's true accusers tested and evaluated in open court.
Third, the opinion testimony of the police officer becomes
credible evidence where the information upon which he bases his
testimony may not be credible at all. This problem is especially
acute when the officer's information comes from informants,
whether confidential or otherwise. Thus, what may not be very
credible evidence if presented in court is elevated to a very high
degree of credibility by virtue of its inclusion in the basis of a highranking police officer's opinion.
Because of public interest
immunity, the credibility of such information becomes unassailable
28 0
by the defendant.
Thus, as one lawyer commenting on the CJTCA points out,
The courts must be prepared to look behind the bland assertion and test the
evidence on which it is based. Frankly, if the police are not able or prepared
to produce that evidence, it seems to me that the mere statement is worth
28 1
nothing and the innocent may be wrongly convicted.
The courts should carefully scrutinize whatever information the
prosecution or police claim is privileged, but this will not
compensate for the inability of the defense to attack this evidence if
the judge decides to uphold the privilege. The prosecution is privy
to the information claimed to be privileged. The defense is obviously
not. Thus, the prosecution knows the exact details and nature of
the information when arguing to the judge that the privilege should
be upheld. The defense, on the other hand, will have no knowledge
about the information claimed to be privileged. The defense must
overcome the problem of arguing that the interests in disclosure
outweigh the interests in confidentiality, but without knowing the
underlying facts which would inform the defense of the full extent
of the prosecution's and defense's respective interests. Accordingly,

278. Cf. R. v. Radak, 1 Crim. App. Rep. 187, Crim. L. Rep. 223 (Crim. App.)
(1999). See, for example, Anthony Heaton-Armstrong & David Wolchover, On the
Record-ShouldProsecutionWitnesses Have Their Statements Recorded in the Same
Way as Those Made by Suspects, 90 L. SOCY GAZ. 25 (June 16, 1993):
Police officers who claim to have witnessed the same event or conversation
'collaborate' prior to recording their notes or statements. A joint account is
produced which may exclude details of the individual officer's true
recollection and inconsistent statements made during the collaborative
process.
It would seem that denying cross-examination of those with first-hand knowledge of
such information would only exacerbate this problem in the determination of facts.
279. Cf. R. v. Radak, 1 Crim. App. Rep. 187.
280. See More HasteLess Speed, supra note 274.
281. Findlay, supranote 1, at 15.
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the defense has an inherent disadvantage vis-&-vis the prosecution
when arguing the public interest immunity issue. In most cases,
the good judgment of the trial court cannot make up for this
inequality in information.
It is unlikely that a trial utilizing inferences from the accused's
silence and police opinion testimony, in which claims of public
interest immunity are upheld, would meet the requirements of
Article 6 as explicated by the ECHR. 28 2 For example, the ECHR only
tolerates the admission of statements by anonymous witnesses in
extreme situations where there is no alternative less restrictive to
the defense. It also requires that there be a substantial amount of
corroborative evidence and that this restriction upon the right of the
defense to cross-examine witnesses is counterbalanced by adequate
procedural safeguards.
Because permitting public interest immunity in the context of
police opinion testimony effectively allows the senior police officer to
reiterate information from other witnesses who will remain
undisclosed under the privilege, an analysis similar to the Van
Mechelen case should apply. After all, in Van Mechelen, the ECHR
found a violation of Article 6 where the only affirmative identification
evidence linking the accused to the crime were the statements of
anonymous police officers who did not testify in open court, but
instead had other police officers basically testify as to what the
"eyewitness" police officers saw.28 3
Under Van Mechelen, any
conviction based to a "decisive extent" upon such evidence violates
Article 6.28
Van Mechelen also took into account the special
problems for the defense where the anonymous witnesses were
agents of the state with special ties to the prosecution, which
dictated the use of such evidence only in the most exceptional
circumstances.2 8 5 Accordingly, any conviction under the CJTCA
should not be permitted if it is based to a decisive extent upon the
opinion evidence of a senior police officer who refuses to disclose the
sources of his information based upon public interest immunity.
While Van Mechelen's "decisive extent" test can be overcome by
substantial amounts of corroborative evidence, the ECHR also
requires adequate procedures to counterbalance the disadvantage
to the defense. 28 6
The CJTCA provides no such adequate
counterbalance. For example, the accused will not be able to call

282.
See John Wadham, ProsecutionDisclosure,Crime and Human Rights, 147
NEW L.J. 697 (May 9, 1997) (discussing the law regarding prosecution disclosure in
Great Britain and Article 6 of the Convention).
283.
See Van Mechelen et al. v. Netherlands, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 647, 675-76,
63, 66 (1997).

284.
285.
286.

See id.
Id. 1 56.
Id. 54.
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any credible witness as a defense "expert" in whose opinion the
defendant is not a member of a proscribed organization. 2 8 7 Any
counterbalance would have to be force-read into the statute and
basically require that the public interest immunity be disallowed
when police officers give opinion testimony under the CJTCA. While
the restrictions upon the suspect's right to remain silent will not
alone contravene Article 6, when coupled in the same trial with
police opinion testimony bolstered by public immunity, it will create
such a disadvantage to the defense as to shift the presumption of
innocence and render the trial unfair. 28 8 Only in cases with very
substantial hard evidence in addition to the evidence authorized by
the CJTCA might the conviction be considered fair. This additional
evidence would probably have to rise to a level sufficient to convict
beyond a reasonable doubt anyway, rendering the CJTCA evidence
surplusage for the government's case but nevertheless, an additional
burden for the defendant.
While this analysis is, of course, somewhat speculative given
that the quantity and quality of evidence among individual trials
may differ significantly, it highlights the numerous problems
inherent in the CJTCA, especially in light of the soon to be effective
HRA. Because of these problems and because of the heavy burdens
it places upon the defense, the CJTCA should be repealed.
B. Policy ConcernsDictate in Favor of Repealing the CJTCA

Besides the CJTCA's potential to create serious unfairness in
criminal trials, the wisdom of the statute's provisions and the timing
of its passage is questionable. For one, the CJTCA makes it very
difficult for defense attorneys to adequately represent and advise
their clients. Additionally, whereas the CJTCA was intended to
eradicate terrorist organizations and more specifically to contribute
to the peace process in Northern Ireland, it may have exactly the
opposite effect.2 8 9 Lastly, it may increase the number of convictions

287.
See B6nisch v. Austria, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 191, 200, 32 (1985).
288.
Some civil liberties lawyers claim that the burden of proof is that of a civil
court. See Bindman, supranote 44.
289.
See Andrew Rawnsley & Patrick Wintour, Politics: Nice Guys Can Finish
First"CharlesKennedy Enjoys a Wee Dram and a Good Joke. But He's Serious About
Winning the Party Leadership, THE OBSERVER, Mar. 7, 1999, at 19 (quoting Charles

Kennedy, likely to be the next leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, who cites the
CJTCA as a classic example of coming up with the worst legislative answer, for the
best political motives.) But see Will We Regret Laws Made So Hastily?, LEICESTER
MERCURY, Sept. 14, 1998, at 4:
I generally think that bad laws are made in haste and we will regret the speed
in which [the CJTCA] was brought forward at some time in the future. But
what I also know is that I would have regretted doing nothing and letting a
very small, isolated group of hardened terrorists derail the peace process. I
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for terrorist offenses, but it probably will not deter terrorists or
2 90
actually assist in their apprehension.
1. The Awkward Position of the Defense Attorney
One of the few procedural safeguards afforded to a terrorist
suspect in the CJTCA is that as a prerequisite to the drawing of
inferences from silence, the suspect must have been permitted to
consult with a solicitor before the questioning took place. 2 9 1 In fact,
Home Secretary Jack Straw, who has the power to proscribe
organizations, stated that the measures of the CJTCA are "tightly
focused and proportionate measures which contain safeguards for
suspects. "2 92 Critics point out, however, that this safeguard is
inadequate.
For example, a suspect will not necessarily have the right to
consult with counsel while being interviewed. 2 9 3 Furthermore,
neither the client nor the attorney will know why the client is being
interviewed. 29 4 The lawyer will be charged with the task of first

voted for the Bill in the hope that the risks we have taken over the last year,
accompanied by this Act will lay the foundations for a lasting peace in
Northern Ireland.
290. There is also a danger that it will be used to extend beyond terrorism trials
to other criminal prosecutions, especially in prosecutions related to organized crime
and drug trafficking. See More Haste Less Speed, supranote 274. The government
has not officially indicated whether its anti-terrorist legislation will apply to rightwing groups such as neo-Nazis. See Jimmy Burns & Rosemary Bennet, Engineer
Charged Over Nail Bombings, FIN. TIMES (London), May 3, 1999, at 1 (noting that
government officials said ministers were not likely to extend anti-terrorist legislation
to cover right-wing groups).
291.
See CJTCA, supranote 4, ch. 40, § 2A(4)(b)
292. Bindman, supra note 44.
293.
See R. v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, [19971 N.I. 278
(H.L.) (recognizing a British common law right of access to counsel while in custody,
but holding that this right does not extend to interrogations of suspects in Northern
Ireland arrested under the PTA); In the Matter of Michael Russel & Others for
Judicial Review, HUTE 2184 (Q.B., Oct. 25, 1996) (holding that suspects have no
right to have a lawyer present during an interrogation); Report on the Mission of the
Special Rapporteurto the United Kingdom ofBritain and NorthernIreland, U.N. ESCOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 8, addendum pt. 3, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/39/Add.4, 43 (Mar. 5, 1998) (noting the RUC's practice of denying
access to a lawyer at all stages of interrogations in Northern Ireland of suspects
arrested under § 14 of the PTA); see also Bindman, supranote 44. These practices
may have to change when the Human Rights Act becomes effective, and they may
change if recent proposals for the overhaul of the policing system in Northern Ireland
are implemented. See generally Report of the Independent Commissionfor Policingin
Northern Ireland (Patten Commission),
4.8, 4.11, Sept. 9, 1999 (proposing that
codes of practice on all aspects of policing, including covert operations, accord strictly
with the Convention and recommending that a lawyer specializing in human rights
be appointed to the staff of police legal services).
294. See Bindman, supranote 44.
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explaining to the client that he technically has the right to remain
silent and that whatever the client says might be used against him
in court.2 95 Next, the lawyer will have to explain to the client that
despite this "right," if the client chooses to remain silent during
interrogation, inferences may nevertheless be drawn from the
suspect's failure to answer questions regarding a material fact. 2 96
the suspect's silence is complicated
Explaining the law 2 regarding
97
enough on its own.
The lawyer will then have to define for the client what might be
a "material fact," even though both lawyer and client may be
ignorant as to why the client is even being questioned. 2 98 Finally,
the client will have to remember and apply all of the advice of the
lawyer during the interrogation, as his lawyer may not be permitted
to be present.2 9 9 As prominent British civil liberties lawyer John
Wadham points out, "This will mean not only that it will be
impossible for solicitors to advise their clients adequately, but that
once they have been consulted the clients themselves will be
expected to understand and apply complex legal principles. Their
failure to do so will have dire consequences." °° These problems
faced by defense counsel adversely affect the representation of the
301
client, which creates the potential for serious unfairness at trial.

295.
See id.
296.
See id.
297.
Consider the following warnings contained in arrest cards issued by Irish
welfare organizations in Britain, before the passage of the CJTCA, in the event that
someone is detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA):
IF YOU ARE DETAINED:
No one can entirely predict how they will cope with being detained for the first
time. It is important to bear in mind that your detention will probably have
little to do with being a "suspected terrorist" and more to do with general
information gathering and intimidation of the Irish Community.
1. We strongly recommend that beyond giving your name, address and
date of birth you decline to answer any further questions and demand
to see your solicitor. Be prepared to make this request repeatedly.
2. If you feel you wish to answer questions or make a statement we
strongly advise that you do so only in the presence of your solicitor. On
no account sign any statement without first seeing your solicitor. (Do
not use a Duty Solicitor)
The Pat Finucane Center, The Prevention of Terrorism Act-Advice to the Irish
Community (visited Jan. 12, 2000) <http:www.serve.com/pfc/pta.html>. How should
such a card read now, given the provisions of CJTCA?
Paul McGee, legal officer at the Campaign for the Administration of
298.
Justice, has said, "These safeguards go no way to assist the suspect as neither he
nor his solicitor will be aware of what they will be interviewed about." Bindman,
supranote 44.
299.
See id.
300.
Id.
301.
See Beckman, supra note 39 at 109-16 (describing the difficulties of
explaining the scope of the right to silence under the Criminal Justice and Public
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If only because of these problems, the CJTCA should be
repealed.3 0 2 At a minimum, it should be amended to give suspects
the right to have their lawyers present during interrogation. But
repealing the CJTCA entirely would save British courts the time and
expense resulting from HRA litigation challenging practices
authorized by the CJTCA.
2. The CJTCA Will Undermine the Specific Goals for Which It
Was Passed-Reducing Terrorist Activity in Britain and Bolstering
the Irish Peace Process
Although the CJTCA was passed in the aftermath of one of the
worst bombings in Northern Ireland's history, it also came at a time
when there was broad-based support for peace in the region. The
Northern Ireland Executive, elected by the population of the six
counties, was on the verge of having power devolved to it from
Westminster, giving the region its first local government since 1972.
Most of the more militant extremes in Northern Irish politics have
been marginalized. Most importantly, the political parties that
formerly endorsed political violence and have widespread support in
some communities, such as Sinn Fein, have endorsed the peace
process and have become active participants.
Implicit in this
process is a reconciliation of two communities that have been at war
with each other for centuries and a growing trust by each of these
communities of both the British and Irish governments.3 0 3 While
this fragile peace process has hit some stumbling blocks as of

Order Act 1994, which permitted inferences to be drawn from silence similar to that
provided for in the CJTCA, ch. 40, § 1(4)-(5)).
302. These client advisory issues will be even more troublesome for defense
counselors in Northern Ireland, who already face a range of obstacles to effectively
representing their clients. These obstacles include, inter alia, death threats,
inhibited access to clients, hostility from security forces and government officials, and
governmental emergency powers more extensive than in the rest of the United
Kingdom. See generally Flaherty, supranote 268, at 1, 2-5; Martin Flaherty, Human
Rights ViolationsAgainst Defense Lawyers: The Case of Northern Ireland,7 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 87(1994). CompareReport of the Special Rapporteuron the Independence of
Judges and Lawyers, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 55th Sess., Agenda Item 11 (d)
186, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/60 (Jan. 13, 1999) (stating that the Special
Rapporteur was satisfied that there had been harassment and intimidation of defense
counsel by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)), with Rachel Donnelly, Harassment
of Lauyers is Denied, IRISH TIMES, Apr. 24, 1999, at 7 (reporting that the Independent
Commissioner for Holding Centers in Northern Ireland rejects the Special
Rapporteur's conclusion that members of the RUC harassed defense lawyers).
303. 'Finally it should be remembered that today's terrorists are tomorrow's
freedom fighters, next months political opponents and, next year, 'our oldest allies.'
We have seen this change in attitude and language in Israel, Kenya, and Cyprus and
we may be seeing it in Northern Ireland." More Haste Less Speed, supranote 274.
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late,3 0 4 an opportunity still remains for the British government to
aid in the creation of a lasting peace in the region.
The CJTCA also comes at a time of widespread fear of Arab
terrorism in Europe and North America. Events such as the
bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, the bombing
of the World Trade Center in New York, and the bombings of two
U.S. embassies in Africa have heightened what might be an
unwarranted fear of Arab communities in both the United States
and Europe.
Given these circumstances, the CJTCA may become an abusive
tool and is likely to be aimed at suspects who come from both the
Irish and Arab communities in Britain.3 0 5 This is troubling for
primarily two reasons. First, relationships and associations that a
person may naturally have because of their ties to one of these
communities might serve as a substantial factor: in the "opinion" of
a police officer, that person is a member of a terrorist organization.
The basis of such an opinion may be unassailable in court. Second,
the CJTCA will only create more resentment of the British
government and ironically contribute to the support of those who
espouse violence as a legitimate and viable political tool. This will
ultimately undermine the peace process in Northern Ireland, not
strengthen it, and is at odds with the spirit of reconciliation fostered
over the past few years.3 0 6 As one lawyer commenting on the law

304. For news specifically related to the Irish peace process updated daily, see
generally IRISH TIMES, The Path to Peace (visited Jan. 12, 2000)
<http://www.ireland.com/special/peace/assembly/news/ index.htm>.
305. Cf. Bennetto, supranote 22.
306. As of late September 1999, the peace process is at a very fragile point. In
the process of attempting to form an executive, to which Sinn Fein is entitled two
seats, negotiations have stalled over the issue of the decommissioning of IRA arms.
The UUP, the largest party in Northern Ireland, which represents the majority of
Unionists, is demanding that the IRA decommission its arms before it will form an
executive with Sinn Fein, the political party affiliated with the IRA, which has
substantial support in many Catholic communities, especially Catholic ghettoes. See,
e.g., Guns At the DoorPlease, Trimble Tells Sinn Fein, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 10, 1999, at
14; Rosie Cowan, M&thell Still Hopeful on Peace Breakthrough,PRESS ASsoc. NEWSFILE,
Sept. 23, 1999; Mervyn Pauley, Accusations Mark CrucialParty Talks; Sinn Fein and
UUP Clash OverAgreemen4 BELFAST NEWS LETTER, Sept. 22, 1999, at 6; Peter Taylor,
Wild Men Waiting on the Thin Orange Line, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Feb. 28, 1999, §
6, at 5 (discussing the readiness of the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), a loyalist
paramilitary unit, for a violent civil war should the peace process fail). The CJTCA
may give the IRA even more reason not to decommission. In some areas, they are
seen as the defenders of the community against brutality and oppression from the
police, military, and unionist paramilitaries. Many people in these communities who
support the IRA feel that to give up weapons would mean surrendering to the
government. See, e.g., Jimmy Bums, McGuinnessPessimisticon IRA Climbdown, FIN.
TIMES (London), Mar. 1, 1999, at 8 (quoting Sinn Fein's chief negotiator Martin
McGuinness as saying, "fI]n my view there isn't the remotest possibility of the IRA
responding to this unilateral demand from the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party,
which amounts to a demand for the surrender of the IRA."). They might see the
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pointed out, as the communities in Northern Ireland try to rebuild
a society and government based on the rule of law, "the government
30 7
passes significant legislation departing from it."
For example, the CJTCA applies in Northern Ireland. It is
especially dangerous to people living in communities who have
supported paramilitary organizations over the last thirty years, such
as particular urban neighborhoods in Derry and Belfast and rural
areas in counties Tyrone and Armagh. In these communities, some
people may naturally associate with known members of paramilitary
organizations in social or business environments. It does not take
much for a police officer to infer from such relationships that a
person may be involved with a proscribed organization. This is
especially troubling in a region like Northern Ireland where the
police, who are overwhelmingly Protestant and pro-British, are often
the primary targets of political violence emanating from
predominantly Catholic nationalist communities.
Even more
troubling are the possible links between the police and Loyalist
paramilitary groups in some areas.3 0 8 Even personal vendettas may
30 9
underlie a police officer's "opinion."

CJTCA as another tool of oppression and discrimination depending on how it is
applied by the police, a body whose human rights record over the last thirty years is
replete with abuse. If the peace process falls apart, the CJTCA becomes even more
dangerous as it may again become another weapon in a war between two
communities, instead of a tool simply utilized to isolate a few extremists. The peace
process may very well fall apart because of accusations that the IRA has not
remained committed to its ceasefire. See John Murray Brown, CeasefireRuling Faces
Court Challenge,FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 21, 1999, at 11 (discussing a challenge
to the Northern Ireland Secretary's ruling that the IRA has not broken its ceasefire
despite allegations of involvement in a Florida gun-running scheme and two recent
assassinations). If the ruling is reversed, the British government may have to
exclude Sinn Fein from the peace talks.
307. Bindman, supranote 44.
308. For example, a recent report of the British Irish Rights' Watch (BIRW)
alleges collusion between the Royal Ulster Constabulary (the police force in Northern
Ireland), M15 (the U.K.'s equivalent of the CIA), and Loyalist paramilitaries in the
1989 assassination of renowned criminal defense lawyer Patrick Finucane. Finucane
had made a name for himself as a successful defender of Republican defendants in
Northern Ireland's courts. See Jack Flynn, Report Links RUC to FinucaneMurder,
IRISH VOICE, Feb. 17, 1999, at 8; see also BritishArmy Can Conceal Amount Paid to
Nelson, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 11, 1999, at 7 (discussing civil claims by Finucane's widow
against the Ministry of Defense and Brian Nelson, an army intelligence agent also
serving as intelligence officer to a loyalist paramilitary organization called the UDA,
alleging that Nelson targeted Finucane for assassination and that the army
intentionally failed to warn Finucane or provide him with protection); Mervyn Pauley,
Ex-UFF Man to Face Collusion Claims Quiz, BELFAST NEWS LETTER, Mar. 6, 1999, at 6
(discussing police plans to interview a former member of the UFF, a loyalist
paramilitary organization, about allegations that police and army intelligence
documents on IRA suspects were handed over to his terror group).
Collusion between the RUC and loyalist paramilitaries has also been alleged in
the recent murder of defense lawyer Rosemary Nelson in March. See Martin Fletcher
& Ian Brodie, FBIto Oversee UlsterBomb Investigation,THE TIMES (London), Mar. 17,
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Added to this danger of irrational application of the CJTCA is the
perception, whether based on the truth or not, that might develop
within these communities that this law and others like it are
purposeful attempts to target and harass them. Convictions of Arab
or Irish terrorist suspects are bound to create more martyrs and
3 10
undermine any peace that might exist presently or in the future.
It will undermine any trust or respect which was being built
between these communities and the British government and
between those communities and the police force.3 1 1 Thus, the

1999, § 1, at 12; see also United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Press
Release, Special Rapporteur on Independence of Judiciary Calls for Independent
Investigationinto Murderof NorthernIrelandHuman Rights Attorney, HR/99/21 (Mar.
16, 1999) (reporting the Special Rapporteur's call for an independent investigation
into Nelson's assassination). This prompted the U.S. Congress, at the behest of
Congressmen Chris Smith and Peter King, to cut-off funding for U.S. sponsored
training and exchange programs to the RUC until an independent investigation into
the Nelson and Finucane murders was initiated. See Julie O'Connor, US Congress
Halts RUC Training Fund; New Call for Independent Murder Probe, BELFAST NEws
LETTER, Apr. 16, 1999, at 4. The move was proposed by Congressman Chris Smith,
chairman of the subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, and
is intended to interrupt the training of RUC officers at the FBI academy in Quantico,
Virginia. See Audrey Magee, US Stops 'Biased'RUC's Funding,THE TIMES (London),
July 23, 1999, § 1, at 10.
Collusion between the Security Forces and Protestant paramilitaries had been
alleged in the late 1980s by John Stalker, the former Manchester police chief brought
in by the British government to make an independent inquiry into such allegations.
Stalker's report was suppressed by the British government when Stalker found
substantial evidence supporting allegations of collusion and a shoot to kill policy by
the security forces. See generally JOHN STALKER, THE STALKER AFFAIR (1988); see also
Report of the Special Rapporteuron the Independence of Judges and Launjers, supra
note 302,
191 (concluding that there is a prima facie case of collusion in Finucane's
murder and calling for an independent investigation); SEAN McPHILEMY, THE
COMMITTEE: POLITIcAL ASSASSINATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1998) (alleging that the
RUC had active death squads and aided loyalist paramilitaries in the assassination
of republicans as well as innocent nationalists, McPhilemy was aided in his research
by assassinated defense lawyer Rosemary Nelson); Affidavit of John Weir, Feb. 3,
1999, State Sponsored TerrorBritish Collusion in Murder and Terrorism(visited Jan.
12, 2000) <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHll/Senate/1922> (alleging RUC
involvement in bombings in the Republic of Ireland and in supplying loyalist
paramilitaries with weapons). Weir is an ex-RUC officer who was convicted of
terrorist offenses. See id.
309.
See In the space of a couple of hours, supra note 3, at 11 (Stating that
"[h]earsay, finger-pointing and the settling of grudges could very easily decide just
who these suspects might be. The net is cast so widely it could potentially take in
everyone from activists, sympathisers, relatives, associates, or those who have
spoken publicly, for political reasons, against the peace process.").
310.
See id. ("[the CJTCA] also, most unusually, plays directly into the hands
of [sic] those extremists it is aimed at defeating. It sows the seeds of grievances
among a wider constituency who suffer the fallout from authoritarian powers, and
so allows fanatics to exploit their discontent.").
311.
"Like earlier anti-terrorist measures it is likely to target communities with
intimidation and harassment, resulting in increased support for paramilitary
organisations, and... the weakening of respect for the rule of law." Bindman,
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CJTCA might ironically create support for violence in some
communities where the peace process is perceived to have failed and
to have brought little in the way of respect for their rights.3 12 The
history of British legislation dealing with Northern Ireland justifiably
makes some people suspicious of any measures aimed at
3
31

terrorists.

3. The CJTCA Is Unlikely to Deter Potential Terrorists or Aid in
Their Apprehension
The CJTCA is also unlikely to aid in the apprehension of
terrorists or to deter potential terrorists from committing offenses.
The targets of the CJTCA are political extremists, many of whom
have already been punished greatly for causes in which they believe.
The presence of what amounts to an army of occupation in their
midst has done little to deter them in the past, and a new law of
evidence is unlikely to do so in the future. In the long run, all that
the CJTCA may accomplish is an increase the number of terrorist
convictions and, given the evidentiary burdens that face these
suspects, a corresponding increase in the number of innocent
people falsely convicted.3 1 4 In the short term, the CJTCA may
actually hinder efforts at apprehending the actual wrongdoers.
Some commentators have noted that the police are presently
apprehensive about using the new legislation because of its

supra note 44. Public confidence in the police in Britain is reportedly at a low due
to civil rights abuses. See Liz Parratt, Holding the Thin Blue Line in Place, THE TIMES
(London), Feb. 9, 1999, § 5, at 37. Additionally, the police force in Northern Ireland
has failed to gain the confidence of many nationalists despite the peace process
proposed reforms, and many question whether it ever will. See, e.g., Linda Moore,
Policingand Change in NorthernIreland: The Centrality of Human Rights, 22 FORDHAM
INT L L.J. 1577 (1999); Jimmy Bums, Distrust Continues, 30 Years After the
Barricades,FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 9, 1999, at 10; Michael Settle, All Changefor
the RUC; Ulsteris Preparingfor Sweeping Reforms to Policing Which Must Satisfy Grave
Doubts on Both Sides, THE HERALD (Glasgow), Sept. 9, 1999, at 7.
312.
See Moore, supra note 311, at 1589 (arguing that emergency legislation
is counter-productive in that it fuels conflict as well as creates alienation from and
hostility toward the state in communities experiencing harassment).
313. For example, emergency powers such as internment without trial have
been a hallmark of British policy toward Northern Ireland throughout the course of
this century and have done little to bring peace to the region. See Peter Kellner, Why
We May Live to Regret This Rash New TerrorLaw, EVENING STANDARD (London), Sept.
3, 1998, at 4; See generally, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Fortificationof an Emergency
Regime, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1353 (1996). The CJTCA, while it may not explicitly confer
emergency powers, is certainly similar in that it does restrict the trial rights of
terrorist suspects and is intended as a measure to create peace in Northern Ireland.
314.
See generally Siobhan Keegan, Note, The Criminal Cases Review
Commission's Effectiveness in HandlingCasesfrom NorthernIreland,22 FORDHAM INTL
L.J. 1776 (1999) (noting that emergency legislation such as the PTA increases the
potential for miscarriages ofjustice and inhibits efforts to correct those wrongs).
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questionable legality, and because they fear upsetting the Irish
3 15
peace process by using such controversial legislation.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998
contravenes both the letter and spirit of the European Convention
on Human Rights. The CJTCA's provisions restricting the right to
silence and provisions for "opinion" testimony by senior police
officers, in conjunction with the public interest immunity privilege,
will combine to shift the presumption of innocence and render most
trials of terrorist suspects "unfair" under European Court of Human
Rights case law. Additionally, the implementation of the CJTCA
threatens to undermine the peace process in Northern Ireland. It
will be used to discriminately target certain communities in Britain,
particularly the Arab and Irish communities. The CJTCA will, thus,
contravene the purpose and the explicit provisions of the Human
Rights Act incorporating the European Convention on Human
Rights. Accordingly, the CJTCA should be repealed.
Kevin Dooley Kent?

315. See, e.g., Jimmy Burns & Robin Allen, PoliceArrest Radical Moslem Cleric
Wanted by Yemen, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 16, 1999, at 9 (while reporting on the
arrest of a radical Moslem cleric wanted by Yemen for involvement in international
terrorism, the article notes that British police have been reluctant to arrest terrorist
suspects under the new anti-terrorism laws because of the controversy surrounding
them); Chris McLaughlin & Ted Oliver, W~hy Are the Omagh Bombers Still Free One
Year On? Arrests Mght Upset the IRA, MAIL ON SUNDAY, Aug. 8, 1999, at 12 (arguing
that the security forces in Northern Ireland fear that the political expediency with
which the law was passed, the complexity of the law, it's questionable legality, as well
as the potential that the peace process would be destroyed if Provisional IRA
members are arrested under the law, are combining to hamper attempts to charge
bombing suspects. The authors claim that senior police officers are wary of charging
suspects when the law's legality is questionable, only to see them freed on a
technicality in the near future.).
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